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The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric
Essay in Postcolonial Jurisprudence
WALTER J. WALSH*
[T]he [Irish] Catholics, now ground into dust, deprived of education and property,
and every means of acquiring either, became null in their native country. They had
no part in the framing or execution of the laws, being excluded from the
parliament and the bench, and from juries, and from the bar. Their only duty was
to bear with patience the penalties inflicted on them, and be spectators of the
ludicrous, though interested, quarrels of their oppressors. When any question
under the penal laws was tried against them, it was by a Protestant judge, a
Protestant jury; and as they had a Protestant prosecutor, so they must have a
Protestant advocate. What justice they could look for, Heaven knows; they were
shut out from all corporations and offices and every privilege belonging to
freemen.... in short, they were humbled below the beasts of the field.'
William Sampson
These words were written by the banished human rights advocate William Sampson
just a few years before he won the first ever constitutional triumph for religious
freedom and equality. In his famous test case of People v. Philips,2 Sampson
established the priest-penitent evidentiary privilege for the thousands of exotic Irish
Catholic refugees who had recently landed in New York City. Philips was decided by
Mayor De Witt Clinton in New York City's Court of General Sessions in June 1813. A
pioneering court reporter and radical cause lawyer, the Irish Protestant Sampson
ideologically secured their shared courtroom victory with his hefty report of Philips,
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1. MEMOIRS 252 (New York 1807).
2. People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE
CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA: WHETHER A ROMAN CATHOLIC CLERGYMAN CAN BE IN ANY
CASE COMPELLABLE TO DISCLOSE THE SECRETS OF AURICULAR CONFESSION (photo. reprint 1974)
(New York, Edward Gillespy 1813).
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published later that year as The Catholic Question in America.3 This Article chronicles
the subversive but powerful influence of Philips in transforming the law of evidence.
As I have recently argued, today William Sampson's rare, but lately reprinted, law
report of Philips remains a wonderful early classic of hibernocentric postcolonial
jurisprudence.4 1 define those terms as follows: First, a postcolonial perspective is one
that identifies and rejects those political, aesthetic, and intellectual structures and
canons that are imperialist in origin and form. Although not the culturally dominant
vision, this postcolonial perception is at least comprehensible to the majority of the
world's population. By definition, colonizers exert power far beyond their numbers.
Second, hibernocentric means seen from an Irish standpoint. While this may initially
seem quaint to many readers, recall that the culturally dominant North American and
English perspectives are also quaint, at least when viewed by an outsider. In other
words, every voice, including your own, is culturally specific. Hibernia, the land of
winter, was the Roman name for that far-flung Celtic island in the Atlantic Ocean,
where the Roman writ never ran, on the seeming edge of the world. Of alternative
voices the postcolonial Irish perspective is among the most interesting, coming from
both the earliest of England's overseas prizes and from the first indigenous population
to regain independence from British colonial rule and establish a democratic
republican regime.'
Finally, jurisprudence is an effort to understand the meaning, the significance, and
the workings of law. A postcolonial jurisprudence is, therefore, an approach to these
questions that explores the relationship between law and imperialist origins.
Postcolonial thinkers perceive much dominant law as the product of imperialism and
thus inherently questionable. More particularly, an hibernocentric postcolonial
jurisprudence perceives many dominant legal rules as historically anglocentric and for
that reason suspect.
This study in postcolonial jurisprudence traces the history of the Irish-American
priest-penitent privilege from its radical inception in Philips. In recent years, that once-
controversial, later-forgotten decision has suddenly returned to the historical center of
judicial and scholarly discourse.6 From the perspective of legal doctrine, Philips is the
historical foundation of two important principles. One part of its jurisprudential legacy
3. SAMPSON, supra note 2. In addition to the facsimile reprint of Sampson's 1813
edition by Da Capo Press in 1974, other substantially complete reprints include an edition
revised to avoid seditious libel prosecution (Dublin, 1814), and an edition that was printed but
not published (New York, 1871). Also, incomplete extracts and abstracts have frequently been
culled from Sampson's original 1813 report, but these should not be relied upon by serious
scholars.
4. My article The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2004), shows the
jurisprudential influence of Philips in introducing the judicial free exercise exemption into
American constitutional thought. The present Article shows the jurisprudential legacy of Philips
in introducing the priest-penitent privilege into American evidentiary theory, where it has
appeared in constitutional, common-law, and statutory forms. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-
9877, 2005 WL 1262549 (U.S. May 31, 2005), the United States Supreme Court unanimously
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to legislative (as opposed to judicial) free exercise
exemption, which includes the now-ubiquitous statutory codifications of the Philips priest-
penitent privilege.
5. See generally, ROBERT KEE, THE GREEN FLAG (1972)
6. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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is a broad constitutional principle. Philips, the first constitutional victory for religious
freedom and equality, established the postcolonial rule that government must
sometimes accommodate free religious exercise by recognizing individual exemptions
from burdensome laws. In such cases, government may not enforce the challenged law
unless it establishes some pressing social interest that outweighs religious freedom. In
another article, The First Free Exercise Case, I follow the turbulent history of that still
controversial constitutional axiom.7
In addition to its broader constitutional implications for religious exemptions,
Philips is the source of the postcolonial Irish-American clergy privilege-a guarantee
that a religious minister may not be forced to reveal confidences received in the course
of spiritual counseling. In this Article, my specific historical focus is that evidentiary
principle-the priest-penitent privilege against compelled testimony. I will examine the
evidentiary evolution of the American priest-penitent privilege beyond its
hibernocentric, postcolonial constitutional origin in Philips. After its radical inception
in that Jeffersonian courtroom, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the
constitutional basis of the priest-penitent privilege had been obscured by its widespread
codification, so that the exemption was commonly viewed as a legislative phenomenon.
In addition to its constitutional and statutory manifestations, the priest-penitent
privilege has also been justified as an extension of sound common-law reasoning.
Upon closer inspection, it will become apparent that the doctrinal history of the
priest-penitent rule is indeed one of shadows, illusions, and myth. It was only after the
Second World War that William Sampson's original constitutional theory of the priest-
penitent privilege regained its antebellum dominance. In the 1950s, David Louisell
expressed his belief that the historic evidentiary privileges of confidential
communication, including the priest-penitent privilege, protect significant human
values that are deeply rooted in our political and social fabric.
They are, or rather by the chance of litigation may become, exclusionary rules; but
this is incidental and secondary. Primarily they are a right to be let alone, a right to
unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state's
coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping.
8
Professor Louisell attributed widespread confusion to a prevalent tendency to view
evidentiary privileges merely as barriers to the truth in litigation, while deprecating
their social and moral significance. Treating Philips as a prime example of this original
inspiration, Louisell described Father Anthony Kohlmann's 1813 explanation for his
silence as "a cogent statement of the moral, theological, ecclesiastical and secular
sanctions considered to require confidentiality of penitent-confessor
communications. "9
Louisell regarded evidentiary privileges as positive articulations of basic human
rights. He found support for this position in the widespread acceptance of similar
privileges in Western society and perhaps in Eastern legal traditions. Louisell called for
extensive and thorough work in comparative law to learn both the extent to which
7. Walsh, supra note 4.
8. David W. Loui sell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956).
9. Id. at 113 n.58.
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evidentiary privileges are recognized in each country and to uncover their "ultimate
historical roots and precise rationale[s]."' 0 Louisell noted that such historical work
"ha[d] not yet been adequately performed even in our own common law area."'"
At least with regard to the Irish-American priest-penitent privilege, Louisell's
complaint remains true today. Although much has been written on the history of the
priest-penitent privilege, this Article will show that such writing tends toward an
unconscious, but strong, anglocentric tilt. It seems that no scholar has tried to locate
and interpret all the Irish and American sources that inspired this initially
hibernocentric, later more generally American, postcolonial deviation from the English
common law. Since the Second World War, the significance of Philips and its 1828
New York codification12 have gained widespread recognition, but the scholarly inquiry
has never advanced in any truly historical fashion. ' This article is thus the first history
of the Irish-American priest-penitent privilege to identify its primary ideological
impulses and to explain its fascinating postcolonial deviation from the English
common law. Empirically, this history of the priest-penitent privilege seems to confirm
Louisell's hunch that evidentiary privilege law developed as a necessary recognition of
fundamental human rights; going further, this history also reveals the startling role of
American postcolonial codification in advancing republican and democratic principles
in place of anglocentric common-law reasoning.
Curiously, after Philips was carried from multicultural New York, along the
Overland Trail, to the Western frontier during the California gold rush, its codified
influence ricocheted back eastward.' 4 By the 1960s, through this gradual geographic
embrace of fundamental human rights, the radical alternative of Philips had challenged
and ultimately overthrown nationwide the archaic legal principles inherited from the
colonial regime. The last holdouts were in the Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, and New
Hampshire), in the South (Alabama and Mississippi), and in Texas. 15 Today, the
ascendancy of the American priest-penitent privilege marks the completion of a quiet,
jurisprudential revolution. It is not my claim that this process was uniform or
inevitable. Rather, the story you are about to read exposes the conflicting
jurisprudential values of America's emerging republican democracy.
That internal jurisprudential conflict persists today. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 16 the
United States Supreme Court confronted and unanimously rejected the constitutional
argument suggested long ago by District Attorney Barent Gardinier in Philips, the
10. Id. at 101.
11. Id. at 101; see generally Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the
Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631 (1984).
12. 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 1828, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, § 72 (1828).
13. Interestingly, the most impressive history is contained in a multivolume treatise, 26
CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & KENNETH J. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5612
(1992). Other honorable mentions might better be described as historiographical signposts rather
than histories as such. See generally, Michael James Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the
Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328, 336-37 (1976). Although primarily devoted to the
physician's privilege, another useful recent work is David W. Shuman, The Origins of the
Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 Sw. L.J. 661 (1985).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 116-18, 13 1, 210.
15. See infra text accompanying note 212; see also Appendix.
16. Cutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-9877, 2005 WL 1262549 (U.S. May 31, 2005).
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claim that any recognition of a religious exemption from a neutral law must necessarily
amount to an Establishment Clause violation because it favors the members of the
particular sect who receive the benefit. Applied to the priest-penitent privilege, now
codified in all fifty states, this reading would threaten or invalidate those legislative
measures adopted nationwide.
Rejecting the anglocentric premises of dominant American evidentiary theory, this
is an essay in critical jurisprudence. More specifically, borrowing from the subversive
Sampsonian legal method of Philips itself, this history of the Irish-American priest-
penitent privilege captures in fits and starts the ultimate triumph of his radical
hibernocentric postcolonial jurisprudence. In the early American republic, inherited
imperialist and anglocentric antecedent legal principles struggled for authority against
the rival postcolonial impulse that had already inspired the constitutional remaking of
political institutions. As I have previously noted, the colonial legacy bequeathed a
strong continuing tendency to reproduce imperial legal ideology, by definition the
antithesis of postcolonial thought. Imperial anglocentric jurisprudence rejected the
constitutional possibility of a priest-penitent privilege. Then, as now, Philips
confronted those early American republicans with a stark choice between clinging to an
imperialist past and imagining their postcolonial future.
Yet most evidentiary historians of the priest-penitent privilege have remained under
the thrall of anglocentric jurisprudence. Such writers, most conspicuously John Henry
Wigmore, have completely overlooked the ultimately dominant countertheory, drawn
from the radical tenets of United Irish republicanism, that inspired postcolonial
America to deviate from English legal influence. 17 The nineteenth century Irish-
American priest-penitent privilege was, and is, a startling postcolonial recognition of
minority religious and cultural freedom and equality. By privileging the anglocentric,
evidentiary scholars typically undervalue multiple rival sources of American law,
including this influential hibernocentric legal theory and many other contributions. As
one expression of critical race theory, hibemocentric postcolonial jurisprudence
reveals hidden influences and exposes unresolved problems in modem law. This
Article about hibemocentric postcolonial jurisprudence resists the imperial,
anglocentric ideological hegemony that still pervades American legal scholarship.
This history of the Irish-American priest-penitent privilege is also an essay on legal
causation. More specifically, it is a classic case study of human agency, impact
litigation, and human rights lawyering. Through the constitutional test case of Philips,
New York City's refugee Gaelic Catholic minority, represented by their banished Irish
Protestant human rights lawyer William Sampson, won a victory for religious, racial,
and cultural equality for themselves and for all mankind. In its day, almost unthinkably
early, Philips was threatening and controversial to much of the majority population,
just as civil rights lawyering would be a century and a half later.
I begin this Article on the Irish-American priest-penitent privilege by briefly
recounting the story of People v. Philips and describing more fully the nature and
influence of William Sampson's neglected pamphlet law report of this historic human
rights decision. This Article then illustrates how Philips quickly established a
postcolonial antebellum American priest-penitent privilege, especially in the codified
17. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 2285-87 (1923).
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states of the Western frontier. Next, this Article describes the priest-penitent privilege's
deepening American roots as it worked back eastward following the Civil War. This
Article then narrates the history of the early twentieth-century priest-penitent privilege,
greatly distorted by the extraordinary influence of the evidentiary scholar Dean
Wigrnore-a weak historian and worse constitutionalist-who did support the clergy
privilege on policy grounds, but who spread the prevalent misconception that the
privilege rested only on legislative benevolence. This Article then proceeds to relate
the constitutional revival of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege after the Second
World War, a jurisprudential phenomenon that rested squarely on the belated
rediscovery of Sampson's successful argument in Philips. Finally, this Article draws
from Philips some modem lessons about the nature, essence, and consequences of a
Sampsonian postcolonial jurisprudence at the outset of a new millennium.
I. SAMPSON'S REPORT OF PHILIPS
In another article, The First Free Exercise Case, I describe in some detail the
constitutional background ofPhilips and the holding of the court."5 Here, that historic
case is summarized only briefly so that we can turn more quickly to its subsequent,
transformative influence upon the American law of evidence.
Philips was brought as a constitutional test case by the exiled William Sampson, an
Irish Protestant dissident who broke ranks from the colonial ascendancy into which he
was born. In the 1790s, inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution, Sampson
joined the United Irish *movement, a radical antisectarian alliance comprised of
established high-church Anglicans, freethinking Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, and the
oppressed indigenous Gaelic Catholic Irish masses, all committed to dismantling the
divisive system of religious apartheid that still governed colonized Ireland.1 9 As
tensions mounted, the colonial powers responded in the courts with a crackdown on
political dissent.20 As a member of the United Irish legal defense team, Sampson honed
his skills as perhaps the first known cause lawyer, defending numerous trials for
treason, sedition, and seditious libel.21 At stake was the ideal of an antisectarian,
postcolonial Irish republic, founded on democratic and egalitarian principles. In 1798,
a bloody United Irish rebellion broke out and was suppressed at the cost of 30,000
lives. Along with other United Irish leaders, Sampson was imprisoned, disbarred, and
ultimately banished by act of attainder from his native land for his provocative writings
and his activist lawyering.
22
18. Walsh, supra note 4. In shorter form, I also describe the circumstances surrounding
the constitutional test case of Philips in my essay Religion, Ethnicity, and History-Clues to the
Cultural Construction of Law, in THENEW YORK IRISH 48, 53-61 (Ronald H. Bayor & Timothy
J. Meagher eds., 1996).
19. Maxwell Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codification Movement, in
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1776-1876, at 63-64 (1976).
20. Id. at 65-66.
21. Id. at 64.
22. See Walter J. Walsh, Redefining Radicalism: A Historical Perspective, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 636 (1991). For further information regarding Sampson and the United Irish
movement, see DAVID A. WILSON, UNITED IRISHMEN, UNITED STATES: IMMIGRANT RADICALS IN
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After another period of confinement in a Portuguese dungeon, Sampson made his
way to Paris, where he witnessed the adoption of the Napoleonic code and came to
know its primary drafters.23 As revolutionary France began to adopt its own imperialist
ambitions, Sampson resolved to make a new start in the United States, his sole
remaining hope for the construction of a postcolonial egalitarian, democratic society in
keeping with United Irish republican ideology. On Independence Day in 1806, after a
six-week voyage, Sampson landed in New York City.24 The following year, he
published his Memoirs,25 covering the turbulent years from his imprisonment shortly
before the outbreak of the 1798 Rebellion in Ireland to his arrival in America.
Resuming his radical cause lawyering, the exiled Sampson represented numerous
underrepresented groups in American courtrooms. For example, in 1810-11, in one of
America's earliest and most famous labor trials, Sampson defended striking New York
shoemakers charged with a common-law conspiracy to raise their wages.
26
In colonized Ireland, Sampson had already mastered the subversive political power
of radical legal discourse. Usually anonymously, Sampson had published at least five
politically explosive pamphlet reports of major Irish political trials (in most of which
he also participated).27 In the turbulent 1790s, the United Irish advocates consistently
defended political dissidents by arguing that their actions were entirely justified by
democratic and republican principles, that despotic English law should be overturned,
and that it was a tyrannical colonial government that had forfeited its claim to legal
authority.28
The Catholic Question in America must therefore be understood as part of
Sampson's lifelong anticolonial effort to portray Irish history from the perspective of
the vanquished. A tireless and skillful pamphleteer, underground historian,
29
THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1998); MICHAEL DUREY, TRANSATLANTIC RADICALS AND THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1997).
23. See Bloomfield, supra note 19, at 67-70.
24. Id. at 70.
25.WILLIAM SAMPSON, MEMOIRS OF WILLIAM SAMPSON (New York 1807).
26. WILLIAM SAMPSON, TRIAL OF THE JOURNEYMAN CORDWAINERS OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, FOR A CONSPIRACY TO RAISE THEIR WAGES (New York 1810).
27. His reports include WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE TRIAL OF THE REV. WILLIAM JACKSON
AT THE BAR OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH IN IRELAND, FOR HIGH TREASON (Dublin 1795).
Other reports attributed to Sampson but not signed by him include A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE
TRIAL OF WILLIAM ORR (Dublin 1797); A FAITHFUL REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE PROPRIETORS
OF THE NORTHERN STAR AT THE BAR OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, ON THE TWENTY-EIGHTH
OF MAY, 1794, ON AN INFORMATION, FILED Ex-OFF1CIO, BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: FOR THE
INSERTION OF A PUBLICATION BY THE IRISH JACOBINS OF BELFAST ON THE FIFTEENTH OF
DECEMBER, 1792 (BELFAST 1794); FAITHFUL REPORT OF THE SECOND TRIAL OF THE PROPRIETORS
OF THE NORTHERN STAR AT THE BAR OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH, ON THE 17TH OF
NOVEMBER, 1794, ON AN INFORMATION, FILED Ex-OFFICIO, BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: FOR THE
INSERTION OF THE SOCIETY OF UNITED IRISHMEN'S ADDRESS TO THE VOLUNTEERS OF IRELAND ON
THE 19TH OF DECEMBER, 1792 (Belfast 1795). An additional report attributed to William
Ridgeway and William Sampson is REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF ARCHIBOLD HAMILTON ROWAN ON
AN INFORMATION, FILED Ex-OFFICIO, BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF A
LIBEL (Archibold Hamilton Rowan ed., Dublin 1794).
28. Walsh, supra note 22.
29. His views on the place of the 1798 Rebellion in Irish history emerge most directly
from WILLIAM SAMPSON, ADVICE TO THE RICH (Belfast 1796; Dublin 1796); WILLIAM SAMPSON,
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jurisprudential satirist,30 and reporter of political trials,3' Sampson was banished solely
for his radical ideas.32 From exile, in his Memoirs,3 3 his expanded edition of William
Cooke Taylor's History of Ireland,34 and his other writings, Sampson constructed a
revisionist United Irish account of the events that led to 1798. In America, Sampson
gradually sought to extend the implications of the new United Irish historiography into
every possible area of postcolonial republican political theory and practice. 35 Most of
all, he turned his mind to the inherently antidemocratic colonial nature of the English
common law that he so frequently battled against. 6
In perhaps the tour-de-force of his radical lawyering, William Sampson argued
People v. Philips in a crowded New York City courtroom in the summer of 1813.
Sampson, the banished United Irish human rights lawyer, had intervened as amicus
curiae to represent Anthony Kohlmann, an Alsatian Jesuit and the pastor of New York
AN APPEAL FROM WILLIAM SAMPSON (Dublin 1798); SAMPSON, supra note 2; William Sampson.
Conclusion to WILLIAM COOKE TAYLOR & WILLIAM SAMPSON, HISTORY OF IRELAND (New York
1833); SAMPSON, supra note 1; and William Sampson, Introduction to WILLIAM HENRY
CURRAN, THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN, LATE MASTER OF THE
ROLLS IN IRELAND (New York 1820).
30. Sampson also expressed his thoughts on law and politics in several outwardly
whimsical but deeply serious satires. These include REVIEW OF THE LION OF OLD ENGLAND; OR
THE DEMOCRACY CONFOUNDED (Belfast 1794) (attributed to Thomas Russell and William
Sampson); WILLIAM SAMPSON, A FAITHFUL REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF HURDY GURDY (Belfast
1794); TRIAL OF CAPT. HENRY WHITBY FOR THE MURDER OF JOHN PIERCE, WITH HIS DYING
DECLARATION. ALSO THE TRIAL OF CAPT. GEORGE CRIMP, FOR PIRACY AND MANSTEALING (New
York 1812) (attributed to William Sampson).
3 1. CHARLES CURRIER BEALE, WILLIAM SAMPSON-LAWYER AND STENOGRAPHER 19-29
(1906); Callahan, supra note 13, at 336. See, e.g., SAMPSON, supra note 2; WILLIAM SAMPSON,
COMMISSIONERS OF THE ALMs-HOUSE VS. ALEXANDER WHISTELO, A BLACK MAN (New York
1808); SAMPSON, CORDWAINERS, supra note 26; WILLIAM SAMPSON, IS A WHALE A FISH? AN
ACCURATE REPORT OF THE CASE OF JAMES MAURICE AGAINST SAMUEL JUDD (New York 1819);
THE TRIAL OF AMOS BROAD AND is WIFE (New York 1809); WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE TRIAL OF
THE REV. WILLIAM JACKSON AT THE BAR OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH IN IRELAND, FOR HIGH
TREASON (Dublin 1795).
32. Sampson ranked with William Drennan as the penman of the United Irishmen. He
published almost forty books and pamphlets, including many radical political tracts, political
satires, and reports of political trials, as well as frequent contributions to the periodical press,
including the United Irish newspapers the Northern Star and the Press, both of which he
defended after their suppression.
33. SAMPSON, supra note 1.
34. TAYLOR & SAMPSON, supra note 29.
35. For instance, Sampson published his correspondence with James Fenimore
Cooper's uncle, who settled much of upstate New York. See WILLIAM COOPER, A GUIDE IN THE
WILDERNESS OR THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST SETTLEMENTS IN THE WESTERN COUNTIES OF NEW
YORK WITH USEFUL INSTRUCTIONS TO FUTURE SETTLERS (William Sampson ed., Dublin 1810).
36. Sampson's radical codification argument is contained in his TRIAL OF THE
JOURNEYMEN CORDWAINERS, supra note 26, at 32, 45-46, and WILLIAM SAMPSON, AN
ANNIVERSARY DISCOURSE DELIVERED BEFORE THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW-YORK, ON
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6,1823; SHOWING THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, ANTIQUITIES, CURIOSrTIES, AND
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (New York 1824); SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE, AND
CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS LEARNED JURISTS, UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW (Pishey
Thompson ed., Washington, D.C. 1826).
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City's only Roman Catholic Church. Father Kohlmann had been subpoenaed to reveal
the identity of a remorseful parishioner whom he had instructed to return stolen goods
to their rightful owner.37 At that time, English common law inherited from the colonial
regime apparently did not recognize a priest-penitent privilege. 38 When Father
Kohlmann respectfully declined to testify on the ground that he would "prefer
instantaneous death" rather than break the sacramental seal of the confessional,
Sampson argued and won Philips as a test case to secure the religious freedom and
equality of all mankind.39
In Philips, the arguments on both sides were complex and elaborate, and luckily for
posterity Sampson transcribed them in full. Together with his fellow lawyers for Father
Kohlmann, Counselors Riker and Blake, Sampson advanced the novel postcolonial
contention that recognition of a priest-penitent evidentiary privilege was necessary to
honor American constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and equality. To
demonstrate this point, Sampson explicitly contrasted these guarantees of religious
freedom with the repressive Irish penal laws that had been employed to subject the
indigenous Catholic masses in his native land. In response, District Attorney Gardinier
maintained that recognition of an evidentiary privilege protecting Roman Catholics
would confer upon adherents to that religion "a privilege enjoyed by none other., 40
Sampson's postcolonial, United Irish rhetoric persuaded the Jeffersonian American
court headed by Mayor De Witt Clinton, who wrote that the Irish Catholics "are
protected by the laws and constitution of this country, in the full and free exercise of
their religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the application of
insult to their faith, or of torture to their consciences. ' 41
In my article on the First Free Exercise Case, I discuss in some detail the
background, arguments, decision, and the later constitutional implications of Philips;
the curious reader will find much of interest there.42 In tracing the influence of Philips
upon the law of evidence, this Article now turns directly to the quirkyjurisprudence of
legal bibliography. Uncovered, the legacy of Philips is as much a product of its
peculiar bibliographic history as its essential holding. Despite his rhetorical victory in
Philips, William Sampson's work was not done. As Michael James Callahan has
pointed out, "[w]hile the influence of William Sampson and his place in [American
legal] history are lasting because of his association with the codifiers, [he also]
possessed a more arcane talent which helped insure the spread of his legal outlook."
4 3
37. See SAMPSON, supra note 2, at 5, 11.
38. Butler v. Moore (Ire. Ch. 1802), referenced in SAMPSON, supra note 2, at 19-21
(citing I LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 253-55
(Dublin, J. Cooke 1802)),furtherproceedings Butler v. Moore (Ir. H. Ct. Ch. 1805), reported in
2 JOHN SCHOALES & THOMAS LEFROY, REPORT OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH
COURT OF CHANCERY IN IRELAND DURING THE TIME OF LORD REDESDALE 249; THOMAS PEAKE, A
COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EViDENCE 128 (1801); Walsh, supra note 4, at 21. See also TRIAL
OF JOHN URY, 1 AM. STATE TRIALS 114 (John Lawson ed., 1914).
39. For an in-depth discussion of the arguments and decision in Philips, see Walsh,
supra note 4, at 20-38.
40. SAMPSON, supra note 2, at 42-51.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Walsh, supra note 4.
43. See Callahan, supra note 13, at 336.
10452005]
16INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Callahan referred to Sampson's command of shorthand and his practice of publishing
accurate reports of the trials he transformed into high politics.44 He had begun this
practice in Ireland, where he sought to expose the politically corrupt and indefensible
nature of the imposed English common law. Serving as understudy to John Philpott
Curran, the undisputed Demosthenes of the tactically innovative and rhetorically acute
United Irish legal defense team, Sampson developed his skill as a stenographer to
combat the government's control over legal ideology.
4 5
Without delay, Sampson published his comprehensive record of the fast successful
free exercise case under the name The Catholic Question in America. As Callahan
notes, in the early American republic there were substantial legal barriers to the
recognition of the priest-penitent privilege. "Yet those same authorities had to bow to
the arguments and to the pen of William Sampson, who not only argued for the
recognition of this privilege in 1813 but also published a report of the otherwise
obscure case.'4 Sampson's 1813 work is the original and authentic report of Philips,
now readily accessible since its facsimile reprint in 1974, and it should invariably be
relied on by serious researchers. It is a remarkable historical record of a major
constitutional event: Sampson's original 1813 report includes in full the proceedings
(12 pages), the arguments of counsel (83 pages), Mayor Clinton's opinion (19 pages),
several lengthy appendices (156 pages, in reduced typeface), and much surrounding
detail, all making up a hefty tome of over 260 pages in all.
Due to inadequate attribution by one later editor and misreading of another, modem
legal writers, most conspicuously Justice Antonin Scalia in City ofBoerne v. Flores,47
have almost invariably relied on incomplete derivatives dating from the 1840s. Several
scholars have also sought to marginalize Philips with the throwaway remark that it was
"not officially reported," "unreported," or "unpublished., 48 Such inaccurate
characterization betrays critical ignorance of the central role of private law reporting in
early legal culture. In the postcolonial United States, although "official" reporters were
first appointed for some courts about the turn of the century, they did not actually
become commonplace until the 1820s. Indeed, several early "official" reporters,
including the first two United States Supreme Court reporters, were not in fact
compensated from public funds and had to depend entirely on private subscriptions.49
Law abhors a vacuum, and respected private law reporters including William
Sampson ably filled the needs of lawyers and the public. During those years, the legal
profession relied heavily upon pamphlet law reports for accounts of important cases,
including the impassioned human rights orations of Sampson himself. Until the close of
the Civil War, as John Lawson wrote:
When Rufus Choate or Daniel Webster spoke in Massachusetts or Prentiss or
Marshall in Kentucky or Wright in Missouri or Sampson or Brady in New York,
44. See id. at 336-37.
45. See BEALE, supra note 31, at 19-20.
46. Callahan, supra note 13, at 337.
47. 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L.
REv. 117, 125 (1993).
49. Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective
on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1291, 1300-07 (1985).
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they spoke not only to the crowd in the courtroom but to the American public.
Their orations appeared almost verbatim in the press and were later reported in
pamphlet form and were as eagerly purchased in the book-stores as the best selling
works of fiction are today.
50
Prior to the development of recognizably modem publishing houses, pamphlet
literature occupied a central place in popular culture. According to Bernard Bailyn,
pamphlets may have sparked off the American Revolution.
51
For its advocate and reporter, the banished human right lawyer William Sampson,
The Catholic Question in America's political ambition was greatly enhanced by its
legal setting and its stenographic completeness; Sampson's subversive political aims
are also readily apparent from the several appendices he included. The first was
Sampson's own Irish Penal Code Abridged, a carefully documented historical
demonstration of legal oppression by colonial Protestant rulers against the Gaelic
Catholic masses, interlaced with Sampson's own scathing commentary:
To pursue a tragedy of seven centuries, is not the purpose of this publication; but
it is due to the cause, to the court, and above all, to that magistrate who manfully
assumed the responsibility of the reasons accompanying its unanimous decision, to
shew how malignant the system was, upon which he passed a wise and deliberate
animadversion.
52
Sampson's second appendix to his report of Philips was an equally scholarly
theological dissertation prepared by Father Anthony Kohlmann entitled A True
Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church Touching the Sacrament of
Penance, with the Grounds on Which this Doctrine is Founded.53 According to
Wilfred Parsons, "[i]t is a complete theological treatise on the sacrament, and is in high
regard for its clearness and completeness."54 With a view towards combating persistent
Protestant prejudices, Sampson also appended extracts from the theological responses
of six European Roman Catholic universities to various political queries posed by
William Pitt in 1789 concerning relations between church and state.55 According to
Anson Phelps Stokes, Sampson's use of this material during the trial was quoted with
great effect, and the report was widely circulated by later writers.5 6 Finally, in like vein,
Sampson added a revisionist historical note and even a poem on the history of the
much-traduced Jesuit order (unfortunately omitted from the 1974 facsimile edited by
Leonard Levy).
50. John D. Lawson, Preface to 10 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, at v (John D. Lawson ed.;
1914); see also l id. at x-xi (1914).
51. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1-21 (1967).
52. William Sampson, Irish Penal Code Abridged, in SAMPSON, supra note 2, at 115.
53. Anthony Kohlmann, S.J., A True Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church
Touching the Sacrament of Penance, in SAMPSON, supra note 2, at iii-cxii.
54. J. Wilfrid Parsons, Reverend Anthony Kohlmann, S.J. (1771-1824), in 4 CATH.
HIST. REV. 38, 47 (1918).
55. SAMPSON, supra note 2, at cxiii-cxvii.
56. 1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 789 (1950).
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After presenting a detailed abstract of the case, a reviewer in Port Folio magazine
complained that Sampson had swelled out his report of Philips by means of "a
formidable appendix."
'57
Most of the matter is, so far as regards its bearing on the question in this country,
perfectly irrelevant. But it has now become unfortunately, too much the fashion to
annex by way of note or appendix topics which have very little connexion with the
subject matter of the volume, and answer the double purpose of embarrassing the
reader and enhancing the price of the publication.
58
The Port Folio reviewer's irritation notwithstanding, we are today fortunate that
Sampson's The Catholic Question in America makes up a remarkably comprehensive
record of this unusually early test case. Like Sampson's other pamphlet reports, it
contains a complete transcript of the proceedings, including counsels' arguments. The
book's printer was Edward Gillespy, another Irish immigrant and publisher of The
Shamrock, New York's earliest Irish ethnic newspaper, which often carried Sampson's
arguments.59
William Sampson expressed his pride in making the report public. "The general
satisfaction given to every religious denomination by the decision of this interesting
question," he hoped, "is well calculated to dissipate antiquated prejudices, and
religious jealousies . ,60 He extolled the Philips decision as representing an
emerging postcolonial jurisprudence in republican America. "When this adjudication
shall be compared with the baneful statutes and judgments in Europe, upon similar
subjects," he claimed, "the superior equity and wisdom of American jurisprudence and
civil probity will be felt .... 61 Sampson rightly predicted that his 1813 report of
Philips would "constitute a document of history, precious and instructive to the present
and future generations. 62 Stokes calls Sampson's work "a widely circulated book.' 63
Sampson's report of Philips brought a simmering public controversy to the boil. Its
controversial reception reminds us that by the standards of antebellum America, in
which Irish Catholics constituted both a racial and religious minority, Philips was a
landmark judicial equality ruling. By today's standards of religious equality, Father
Kohlmann's lengthy theological dissertation on the Roman Catholic doctrine of
penance, prepared for inclusion in Sampson's report, seems uncontroversial and even
turgid.64 At the time, however, Philips directly fanned Protestant fears that were buried
deep in American colonial history.65 As the debates over Ury's Trial and New York's
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom illustrated, the sacrament of penance
57. The Catholic Question in America, 2 PORT FOLIO 599, 604 (1813).
58. Id.
59. John P. O'Connor, The Shamrock of New York, The First Irish-American
Newspaper, in 4 N.Y. IRISH HIST. 4 (1989).
60. SAMPSON, supra note 2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 1 STOKES, supra note 56, at 789.
64. Kohlmann, supra note 53.
65. 1 STOKES, supra note 56, at 788-90.
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seemed to many not a spiritual act, but rather a "dangerous and damnable" element of
unthinking and subversive Catholic submission to foreign priestly domination.
66
In the words of Leo Raymond Ryan, the historian of St. Peter's Church, "public
attention had been attracted, a great crowd attended court and heard the priest's
explanations of his position; several ministers raised a hue and cry over his conduct,
and signs of religious dissension began to multiply. '67 Philips squarely raised the
question how far the young American republic would break from its bigoted colonial
traditions to accommodate the increasingly visible influx of mostly Irish Catholic
immigrants. In such circumstances, Father Kohlmann's theological arguments assumed
immediate political relevance.
According to Ryan, "[t]he sensation that the case created, the wide implications that
were involved could not help stir up warm discussion., 68 A principal antagonist was
Charles Henry Wharton, a former Catholic priest who had converted to Protestantism
and emerged as a highly articulate and effective critic of the Roman church. In 1815,
Reverend Wharton published his Short Response to Father Kohlmann's theological
appeal to Protestant sympathy.69 Although attacks on the tenets of Roman Catholicism
were old hat in America, seldom had the heavily outnumbered and legally vulnerable
Catholics so brazenly taken the offensive. After Philips, Catholic propagandists felt no
need to hide their colors. 70 Their new assertiveness posed a major threat to assumed
Protestant cultural dominance in the United States. With his BriefReply, Father Simon
F. O'Gallagher of Charlestown, South Carolina, immediately joined Father Kohlmann
in defending the confessional against Reverend Wharton's assault. 7' The polite and
restrained Father Kohlmann waited for several years before reentering the fray in
typically polite, restrained, and erudite fashion.72
The controversy ignited by Philips over the seal of the confessional marked the
opening shots of an increasingly heated Protestant campaign against Catholic beliefs,
to which the immigrant church rejoined in kind. With each contribution, the issues
were subdivided once again, so that the later debates very nearly argued how many
angels could dance on the head of a pin. Stripped of their underlying political
66. Walsh, supra note 4.
67. LEO RAYMOND RYAN, OLD ST. PETER'S 112 (1935).
68. Id. at 115.
69. CHARLES HENRY WHARTON, A SHORT ANSWER TO A, TRUE ExPosITIoN OF THE
DOCTRINE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TOUCHING THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE WITH THE
GROUNDS ON WHICH THIS DOCTRINE IS FOUNDED (Philadelphia, Moses Thomas 1814); see also
CHARLES HENRY WHARTON ET AL., A CONCISE VIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN THE PROTESTANT AND ROMAN CHURCHES (New York, David Longworth 1817).
70. See generally JOSEPH M. FNoTI, BIBLIOGRAPHIA CATHOLICA AMERICANA 232-34
(New York, Burt Franklin 1872).
71. SIMON F. O'GALLAGHER, A BRIEF REPLY TO A SHORT ANSWERTO A TRUE EXPOSmON
OF THE DOCTRINCE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TOUCHING THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (New
York 1815); see generally 3 JOHN GILMARY SHEA, HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 167
(Akron, OH, D.H. McBride & Co. 1890). Father O'Gallagher's work was reprinted in The
Catholic Question in America and Surrounding Materials, in 1 MANAHAN'S AMERICAN
CATHOLIC MUSEUM, bk. 1-3, (Ambrose Manahan ed., New York 1867), but unfortunately
only one copy of this volume survives.
72. ANTHONY KOHLMANN, S.J., UNITARIANISM, THEOLOGICALLY AND PHILOSOPHICALLY
CONSIDERED (Washington D.C., H. Guegan, 3d ed. 1821).
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ramifications, these early nineteenth-century theological wars today seem
unintelligible. The most original contribution came from the pen of Father John
Hughes, who pseudonymously faked a particularly scurrilous anti-Catholic diatribe to
widespread applause before revealing his own authorship. After the passing of the
United Irish influence in New York politics, Hughes rose to archbishop during the
massive mid-century migration of the Great Famine, and led the Irish Catholics' fight
against the use of nativist texts and compulsory reading of the Protestant bible in the
public schools.
73
Historians of American Catholicism have consistently treated Philips as a signal
victory for religious, ethnic, and cultural equality. After the Great Famine in Ireland,
one out of every four New Yorkers was an Irish immigrant. For decades, the mass
migration of Irish Catholics to the United States had spurred the rise of nativist parties
such as the Know-Nothings, whose hostile, racist attitude towards Irish Catholic
immigrants overshadowed urban politics in Northern cities through much of the
nineteenth century. To some, William Sampson's postcolonial arguments for religious
freedom and equality gained in urgency as migration took its multicultural toll. In mid-
century, the well-known Catholic propagandist Orestes Brownson quoted at length
from Sampson's argument for Father Kohlmann. "As might have been anticipated from
this eloquent appeal," he continued, "but still more from the freedom of our
institutions, the court held the priest exempt from answering the questions proposed to
him. It was gratifying to Catholic feeling, that a guaranty was thus solemnly given to so
sacred a trust.",
74
I. THE ANTEBELLUM PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
Turning now to the history of formal legal doctrine, let us try to trace more carefully
the precedential influence of Philips in establishing the postcolonial priest-penitent
privilege. We are hoping to identify some causal jurisprudential influence.
Just four years after Philips, the first tribunal to revisit this newly-minted priest-
penitent evidentiary privilege was another New York court, the Court of Oyer and
Terminer, presided over by Justice William W. Van Ness, and Judges John Garretson
and John Van Pelt. In People v. Smith (1817),"' the defendant Christian Smith had
been embroiled for sixteen years in a family feud with a difficult neighbor, Bornt Lake.
Smith accused Lake of releasing his swine and they quarrelled also over cattle and
fowl. After numerous lawsuits, mostly initiated by Lake, a prosecution witness
recounted that Smith complained he "could not bear with the night-walking of the
deceased, and intended to fix him." 76 One restless night, Smith heard noises and caught
Lake red-handed filling a large basket under his black walnut tree. Smith pursued Lake,
73. RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860, at 41-68 (1938).
74. The Confessional, 3 BROWNSON'S Q. REv. 327, 341 (1846). Other popular and
scholarly reactions to Philips are recorded in Walsh, supra note 4, at 64-74.
75. 2 Rogers' N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817), reproduced in I
AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 779 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914). I also describe Smith in my article
Walsh, supra note 4, at 40-41; see also RYAN, supra note 67, at 115; Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV L. REv.
1409, 1506 (1990).
76. 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 75, at 781.
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"demanding his nuts, which the other refused to deliver." 77 During this confrontation,
Smith shot and killed Lake with an unusual mixture of goose, duck, and pigeon shot,
matching that later found in his home.
While Smith was in the local jail awaiting trial, he sent for Reverend Peter J. Van
Pelt, his Protestant pastor. Reverend Van Pelt visited Smith and had "several
conversations with him, with a view of exhorting him to penitence and preparation for
his great trial hereafter."78 To prove the substance of these confessions, the prosecution
called Reverend Van Pelt to the witness stand. The clergyman made no conscientious
objection. When defense counsel Price demanded to know in what capacity the
minister was acting in hearing Smith's confession, the Protestant Reverend Van Pelt
responded that anything he knew had been communicated to him as "a minister of the
gospel.,79
At that point, Price strongly protested against Reverend Van Pelt's testimony being
received in evidence. Price thought it "dangerous in the extreme to permit a witness, in
the relation of the one offered, to divulge a communication which must, undoubtedly,
have been made, and ought to have been received, in the strictest confidence."80 In
support of this argument, counselor Price cited Mayor Clinton's recent Philips
decision. He could see no distinction between the two cases.
There was no good reason for restricting such a rule to any particular sect or
denomination. It had no relation to the character of the person in whom
confidence is placed; and whether made to a minister of the gospel, or a counselor
at law, is perfectly immaterial. It arises, altogether, from the presumption, that a
prisoner, for his temporal or eternal safety, considers himself compelled to make
the confession. In this view, it is not to be regarded as voluntary, and, therefore, is
inadmissible.
8 1
It is unclear whether defense counsel Price explicitly invoked New York's religion
clause in addition to Philips.
In response to a direct question from the court, Reverend Van Pelt then sharply
distinguished himself from Father Kohlmann in the first free exercise case by declaring
that he had no conscientious objection to revealing Smith's communications. After
hearing Reverend Van Pelt's religious position, the court ruled Reverend Van Pelt's
voluntary testimony admissible. Conceding the authority of Philips, the bench took an
explicit "distinction between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of
discipline, according to the canons of the church, and those made to a minister of the
gospel in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser."
82
77. Id. at 784.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 783.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 784.
82. Id. John Lawson's version in his American State Trials, published in 1914, quotes
Justice Van Ness as saying "I think there is a grave distinction between auricular confessions
made to a priest ..." (emphasis added). The word "grave" does not appear in Daniel Rogers'
original report. It seems to have been inserted by Lawson when he converted the statements of
the court, counsel, and the witnesses from the third person to the first person. Wigmore relies on
Lawson rather than the original report by Rogers.
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However, as it emerged on the witness stand, Reverend Van Pelt's account of
Smith's prison confessions was quite sympathetic. Smith's story, told by Reverend Van
Pelt, raised some possibility of self-defense. This may have offset the insistence of
other prosecution witnesses, who had examined Lake's wounds, that Smith had fired
his musket from a distance of ten to twenty yards.
The drama of the case was heightened by the remarkable theater in which it was
played out. Because a great crowd of people had converged on the courthouse from all
over Staten Island, the trial was moved to a nearby church. According to the reporter,
"[t]he solemnity of the place, the awful occasion on which the auditory had assembled,
the situation of the prisoner and his weeping relatives who were present, all combined,
were calculated to excite a peculiar sympathy in his favor ... "83 On such an audience,
defense counsel's eloquent appeals to the jury produced an "indescribable" effect.
"Suffice it to say," noted the reporter, "that on the occasion, the divine solemnities of
religion and the awful majesty of the law, in the imagination seemed to have united,
and the tears in every eye, demonstrated the feelings of every heart."
84
Not quite. The court was unmoved. It advised the jury that the evidence afforded
Smith "no chance of escape; his conduct before and after the commission of the crime
had been brutal and barbarous in the extreme; and he was not a safe member of
society." 85 Nevertheless, following the legal practice of the day, the court charged the
jury that they were judges of both law and fact. Seven hours later, Justice Van Ness
made no effort to hide his outrage when the jury returned with a verdict of "not guilty."
With a candid display of his own religious convictions, Justice Van Ness addressed
the lucky defendant in these words:
Christian Smith, you have been tried and acquitted by a jury of your country, for
having taken away the life of one of your fellow creatures. I mean not to censure
the jury who acquitted you, it is not my province so to do; I hope they will be able,
upon future consideration, to reconcile their verdict to their consciences. But I
should feel myself wanting in my duty as a man, if I did not express my opinion
that, notwithstanding their verdict, I consider you a guilty, a very guilty man.
Upon an ancient grudge, you considered yourselfjustified in doing what you have
done; and the jury have, I fear, confirmed your false and fatal judgment. But,
beware, you have not yet escaped. Believe me, your most awful trial is yet to
come. You are now an old man, and your days may be few in this world, and you
will shortly be compelled to appear before another court, where there is no jury
but God himself. Unless you repent, and devote your future life to an humble
atonement of your guilt, your condemnation there is certain. I am thus plain with
you, in order that those who have listened to your trial, may learn that whatever
may be considered to be the law of Staten Island, your conduct is unjustifiable in
the sight of God and man. 
6
83. 2 Rogers' N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77, 82 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817). These
observations by Rogers are omitted from Lawson's American State Trials. Lawson also slightly
edits counsels' arguments.
84. Id. at 81.
85. 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, supra note 75, at 787-88.
86. Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
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Because the jury was empowered to determine the law as well as the facts, Smith's
acquittal might suggest a populist legal principle favoring extension of Philips, a
precedent which the court also approved; the jury may have felt that Reverend Van
Pelt's testimony should have been excluded. However, other influences were also
clearly at work.
The following year, in Commonwealth v. Drake,s7 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld Alpheas Drake's criminal conviction. Drake had confessed his
crime to fellow members of his Baptist congregation, none of whom expressed any
conscientious objection to testifying. On appeal, without recorded citation to Philips,
defense counsel maintained that it would be "in some shape an infringement of the
rights of conscience, to make use of confessions, made under these circumstances...
[where] in a theological view, he is obliged in conscience to perform it." 8' As in Smith,
the prosecution countered that Drake's confession was "purely voluntary" and not
"required by any known ecclesiastical rule."8 9 Drake may therefore have followed
Smith in protecting only mandatory religious confessions. Because the Massachusetts
court stated no reasons for upholding Drake's conviction, it is impossible to tell
whether his evidentiary argument failed on the facts or on legal grounds. Perhaps
significantly, the prosecution did not challenge defense counsel's legal argument, but
merely its applicability to the circumstances of the case. After Drake, the existence of
any clergy privilege in Massachusetts remained in doubt.90
In the 1820s, William Sampson played a leading role in two separate movements
that converged to consolidate the American clergy privilege-the antebellum
codification movement, and the Irish campaign for Catholic Emancipation. Launching
his antebellum codification movement in December of 1823, Sampson delivered his
explosive Discourse on the Common Law to the New-York Historical Society,
attacking the hierarchical origins of the common law and arguing that only a national
code was compatible with the theories of democracy and republicanism. The address
was published the following month with an "electrifying" effect. Over the next couple
of years, Sampson followed it up with a barrage of articles and letters to numerous
correspondents which spilled over from law journals into literary periodicals and the
popular press. Following the War of 1812, Sampson's trenchant assault on the
unrestrained legislative power held by unrepresentative common-law judges appealed
to America's newly nationalist spirit. As a direct result of Sampson's efforts, in 1825
John Duer, Benjamin F. Butler, and John C. Spencer were appointed by the state
assembly to rationalize and codify New York's statutes.
91
While the New York codifiers worked, the issue of religious freedom in Ireland
came to the fore. In 1824, Sampson was joined by Thomas Addis Emmet in arguing for
87. 15 Mass. 161 (1818); see also Walsh, supra note 4, at 47.
88. Drake, 15 Mass 161 (1818).
89 Id. at 162.
90. Greenleaf and Wigmore have caused considerable confusion with their inaccurate
assertion that Drake "denied" the existence of the clergy privilege. See infra Part IV.
91. Bloomfield, supra note 19; CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT (1981); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965); MAURICE
EUGENE LANG, CODIFICATION IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND AMERICA (1924); Maxwell
Bloomfield, William Sampson and the Codifiers: The Roots of American Legal Reform, I 1 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 234 (1967); Walsh, supra note 22.
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New York City's Irish Catholic immigrants after a riot with Irish Protestants in
Greenwich Village on July 12, the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne. As he had in
Philips, Sampson took the opportunity to put English policy in Ireland on public trial.
92
The following year, the New York Irish held a meeting at which they passed a series
of resolutions drafted by William James MacNeven which embodied the United Irish
critique of continuing religious repression in their homeland. This resulted in the
formation of the Friends of Ireland, an organization of Irish exiles which spread
throughout the United States and Mexico, and which provided political and financial
support for the cause of Catholic Emancipation. According to the movement's first
historian, a well-placed contemporary, the New York resolutions rekindled a fierce and
militant Irish republican nationalism fired by United Irish ideals. In 1829, this threat
from the left flank forced the normally conciliatory Daniel O'Connell to adopt the
uncompromising tactics which won Catholic Emancipation, allowing Catholics to sit in
parliament.
In New York, Sampson and MacNeven also reached beyond their immigrant
community by forming the Friends of Civil and Religious Liberty, a coalition of Irish
exiles and liberal American sympathisers committed to religious freedom in Ireland. As
MacNeven explained at one sumptuous banquet for 300 people, "[tihe cause which
convenes us is essentially the same as that which, a few years ago, assembled good
men of all nations and creeds, even at public dinners, for the purpose of giving their
voice against the enslavement of the Africans." 93 The meeting was attended by the
mayor, several judges and lawyers including the recorder and the chiefjustice, several
aldermen, and ministers of all religious persuasions. "Behold those native Americans
around you, among the first for worth and station, and lead in our city," said
MacNeven.
They enrol themselves as friends of Ireland, for the spirit of liberty within them
rises indignant against oppression, and a community of sentiment will ever
produce unity of action among congenial minds, all the world over. Gentlemen!
We may reasonably flatter ourselves that the proceedings of this assembly will
prove favourable to a strong and general assertion of the principles of civil and
religious liberty throughout this great country, and that they will have a beneficial
influence on the same cause in the British isles, where the voice of America
reverberates like the echo .... 94
During the 1820s, the cause of Catholic Emancipation in Ireland attracted international
support.
High feelings on the issue of Irish Catholic Emancipation were not confined to New
York City. In South Carolina, Chancellor Desaussure praised Philips for its inclusive
philosophy. Construing constitutional language directly borrowed from New York's
Article 38, he rejected the prevailing rule that disqualified Universalists as witnesses
because of their disbelief in divine retribution after death. In Farnandis v.
92. People v. Moore, 3 Wheeler's 82, 89-97 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Gen. Sess., Sept. 13, 1824);
People v. M'Evoy, 3 Wheeler's 414, 425-28 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Gen Sess., Oct. 13, 1824).
93. Grand Celebration of St. Patrick's Day: By the Friends of Civil and Religious
Liberty in this City, 1 THE IRISH SHIELD & MONTHLY MILESIAN No. 3, Mar. 1829, at 101.
94. Id. at 104.
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Henderson ,95 the chancellor declared himself unable to conceive the limits of such an
objection. "It may exclude Roman Catholics, who believe that punishments in another
world may be avoided altogether by absolution, or diminished by masses and
prayers." 96 Evidently persuaded by William Sampson's hibemocentric postcolonial
argument for religious freedom in Philips, Chancellor Desaussure continued:
If men may be excluded for their religious opinions, from being witnesses, they
may be excluded from being Jurors or Judges; and the Legislature might enact a
law excluding such persons from holding any other office, or serving in the
Legislature, or becoming teachers of schools, or professors of colleges. In my
judgment this would be in the very teeth of the Constitution, and would violate the
spirit of all our institutions. I do not know in what that state of things would differ
from the galling restraints on the Irish Roman Catholics, which have so long kept
that beautiful country and that high spirited people, in a state of degradation and
misery, of discontent and rebellion.
97
Chancellor Desaussure explicitly invoked the authority of Mayor Clinton's "learned
and elegant" opinion in Philips.98 Chancellor Desaussure was upheld on appeal. 99
In Louisiana, Edward Livingston, an avowed Benthamite who ranks with Sampson
as America's leading early codifier, proposed the priest-penitent privilege in the Code
of Evidence he unsuccessfully submitted to the Louisiana state legislature: "A priest of
the Catholic religion shall not be forced to reveal any thing which he knows only by its
being confided to him in religious confession by his penitent."' l It was during these
concurrent storms over codification in the United States and religious freedom in
Ireland that the New York codifiers issued their 1828 report. Although charged with
statutory revision, the New York codifiers interpreted their mandate broadly and
incorporated the recently recognized clergy privilege into the revised statutes of New
York State. They also undertook an ambitious reform of property law. 101
Mistakenly, it has been said that the New York codifiers wanted to resolve issues
raised by Protestant criticism of Philips, which had been compounded by the admission
of a Protestant clergyman's wilting testimony in Smith. This assertion is not borne out
95. Farnandis v. Henderson (Union Dist. S.C. 1827), reported in 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202,
211-13 (1831). 1 also discuss Farnandis in my article Walsh, supra note 4, at 41.
96. Farnandis, 1 CAROLINA L.J. at 211.
97. ld. at 212.
98.Id. at 213.
99.1d. at 214.
100. EDWARD LIvINGSTON, A CODE OF EVIDENCE (1822), reprinted in 2 COMPLETE
WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 455,466 art. 33(2) (Broadway,
New York, Nat'l Prison Ass'n of the U.S. 1873). For Livingston's reflections on his code, see
Edward Livingston, Introductory Report to the Code of Evidence, reprinted in 1 LIVINGSTON,
supra at 411-504. For commentary on the impact of Livingston's code, see WILLIAM B.
HATCHER, EDWARD LIVINGSTON 275-76 (1940); and 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 5005 (1977).
101. See generally WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, THE REVISION OF THE STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE REVISERS (1889); CHARLES P. DALY, THE COMMON LAW 55-59
(1894); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 525 (1911).
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by the historical record. Significantly, in their report to the legislature, the New York
revisers included the following note:
In a case [Philips] which occurred some years since in the Court of Sessions, New
York, at which DeWitt Clinton presided it was held that auricular confessions
made to a Catholic priest were not to be divulged. Although contrary to the
principle of the English decisions... this decision is believed to have received
general approbation in this country. It was admitted and recognized by Justice Van
Ness in the case of Christian Smith, reported in 2 City Hall Recorder, 80, and a
distinction taken between such confessions as were made in the course of
discipline and such as were made to a clergyman as an adviser and friend. The rule
is too important to be left in its present state and it is therefore proposed to give it
the sanction of legislative authority.1
0 2
This account plainly sets out the New York evidentiary revisers' contemporary
understanding, namely that in Smith, Judge Van Ness had approved the priest-penitent
privilege announced in Philips.
On December 10, 1828, the New York State Assembly passed the revisers' bill
codifying Philips' priest-penitent privilege. As interpreted by the New York codifiers,
Philips covered spiritual communications to clergy of all denominations that required
confidential confessions. The New York codifiers also specified that the penitent as
well as the minister held the privilege. At the time, the governor's mansion was
occupied by none other than De Witt Clinton, author of the court's unanimous opinion
in Philips. In 1817, Mayor Clinton had succeeded Daniel Tompkins, the former judge,
who was elected Vice-President under Monroe. Both New York State governors had
benefited from the political support of the Irish immigrants. It would certainly have
been poetic had Governor De Witt Clinton given final legislative authority to the very
priest-penitent privilege he had recognized as a constitutional imperative while on the
bench! But Governor Clinton's death earlier that year meant that the priest-penitent
privilege was instead signed into law by his lieutenant governor.
10 3
Hugely influential, New York's early statutory codification of Philips read as
follows:
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be
allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional character, in
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination.10 4
102. JOHN DUER, BENJAMIN F. BUTLER & JOHN C. SPENCER, THE REVISED STATUTES OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1828); see also Edward J. McGuire, William Sampson, 15 J. AM.
IRISH HtsT. Soc. 342-43 (1916); Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, in REVISED
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1836).
103. J. R. BAYLEY, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
ON THE ISLAND OF NEW YORK 77-82 (1870).
104. 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. 1828, pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, 72 (1828). Despite assertions to the
contrary, for example Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1450, 1556 (1985), it does not appear from the wording of their committee report that the
revisers objected to the application of the privilege in Smith.
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According to Callahan (who overlooks the simultaneous influence of the swirling
public controversy over Catholic Emancipation in Ireland), "[t]he legislators in 1828
were more interested in the value the privilege had as a break with English law than
they were in its theological and constitutional implications. Nor was its promoter
[Sampson] likely to allow them to forget the fiercely anti-British sentiment on which
the privilege rested."'10 5
Through its New York codification, Philips prompted the nationwide statutory
adoption of the clergy privilege over the next century and a half. It tipped off a domino
effect that ultimately rippled through all the state legislatures. Today, the clergy
privilege is recognized in every state, in the federal courts, and in many foreign
jurisdictions. Roughly half of the American statutory drafters plundered New York's
1828 codification almost word for word. 10 6 During the same period, the Philips holding
was also disseminated through heavily edited reprints of Mayor Clinton's decision,'0 7
judicial citation,"' and increasing scholarly recognition in various nineteenth- and
twentieth-century legal commentary.'0 9
In 1844, in another curious twist in the bibliographic history of Philips, Mayor
Clinton's opinion reached the Western frontier when it was abstracted in the first
volume of Timothy Walker's Western Law Journal, published in Cincinnati. After
lately reading Sampson's report of Philips in The Catholic Question in America, the
law professor and former judge requested an unidentified P. McGroarty to prepare the
abstract. The result was a competent, but highly compressed, 5-page summary of
William Sampson's original 265-page pamphlet law report written in 1813.
McGroarty's 1844 abstract of Sampson's The Catholic Question in America
necessarily includes only brief summaries of the proceedings, of counsel's arguments,
and of Mayor Clinton's opinion. It omits much important detail from the original 1813
report and makes no reference whatsoever to Sampson's appendices. Because Walker,
the law journal editor, attributed his source only to "Mr. Sampson's published
Report"-critically omitting title, date, and place ofpublication-McGroarty's modest
105. Callahan, supra note 13, at 355.
106. Callahan, supra note 13, at 335, 337; Fred L. Kuhlmann, Communications to
Clergymen-When Are they Privileged?, 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 265,268-69(1968); Seward Reese,
Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57, 61-62 (1963); Jacob M.
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 95, 107-08, 135 & n.180.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 119, 188-90.
108. People v. Smith, 2 Rogers' N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817),
reproduced in I AMERICAN STATE TRIALs 779 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914); Farnandis v.
Henderson (Union Dist. S.C. 1827), reported in 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202, 211-13 (1831); Simon's
Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831); Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 QUARTERLY L.J.
128 (Va. Richmond Cir. Ct. 1855); Mullen v. U.S., 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Fahy, J.);
Georgetown Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C.
1987) (en banc); Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994); Simpson v. Tennant, 871
S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 1995
WL 348181 (Conn. Super. Ct., May 31, 1995); Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133 (Va.
Ct. App. 1996); Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997); Cox v. Miller, 296
F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2002); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Writing in 1968,
Kuhlmann discovered only one of these thirteen cases, of the five then decided.
109. See infra at Part IV.
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1844 abstract of Philips has routinely, but mistakenly, been treated as the original
report by most later legal scholars, significantly including the influential, but
unreliable, Wigmore. To McGroarty's abstract, Walker added an interesting Editor's
Note approving the decision on constitutional free exercise grounds." 0 From 1860, the
decision also appeared as a footnote in the fourth edition of Walker's popular
Introduction to American Law. In Walker's work of nationalist jurisprudence, designed
to combat American reliance on English precedents, Philips remained through the tenth
edition of 1895.111
Just a year after Walker published his abstract of Philips, on the western frontier,
pioneer state legislatures took up the codification of Sampson's postcolonial priest-
penitent privilege. New York's 1828 codification of Philips was adopted word for
word by Missouri in 1845, Michigan in 1846, and Wisconsin in 1849. With slight but
influential alterations in the wording, which can be attributed to the Field brothers, the
clergy privilege was recognized by California and then Iowa in 1851.112
In the larger codification movement, with the exception of the priest-penitent
privilege, Sampson played the part of a jurisprudential guerrilla, not that of a legal
technician. In the 1820s, Sampson's Discourse on the Common Law resulted in the
appointment of the New York codifiers Duer, Butler, and Spencer. In 1836, Sampson's
Discourse also inspired David Dudley Field, a legal apprentice whose teacher, Henry
Sedgwick, had joined Sampson's attack on the English common law."3 Between 1848
and 1852, the New York state assembly adopted Field's code of civil procedure,
leaving substantially intact the earlier codification of Philips." 14 Field also inserted the
1828 language adopting the clergy privilege into his proposed wholesale codification
of the law of evidence. David Field's evidence code was never adopted in New York,
but it nevertheless exerted a powerful influence when carried to the western frontier by
his brother, Stephen. 115
Stephen J. Field, David's law partner at the height of his codifying zeal, left the
practice in 1848 to settle in California. He was appointed to the House judiciary
committee during the California legislature's second session in early 1851. In that
capacity, Stephen took it upon himself to revise and remodel his elder brother David's
draft Code of Civil Procedure and secure its passage. Stephen selectively included that
part of the draft evidence code which had already been adopted in New York,
including the priest-penitent privilege, but omitted David's other evidentiary proposals.
Slightly reworded, New York's 1828 clergy privilege statute, as incorporated into
110. McGroarty's abstract is published as People v. Phillips, I WEST. L.J. 109 (1844).
Timothy Walker's commentary is contained in his Editor's Note. Id. at 113-14.
111. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODRUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 611 n.(a) (4th ed. 1860).
See also Callahan, supra note 13, at 333-37.
112. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 335 n.5 (5th ed. 1850).
113. Bloomfield, supra note 19, at 90.
114. See generally Introduction to THE CODE OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, AS AMENDED APRIL 16, 1852 (2d ed. 1852).
115. The New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading (the Field Commission)
final draft, as "reported complete" by the New York Commissioners, included Field's evidence
code in Part IV, and was published in 1850. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (1850). See generally Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the
Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
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Field's proposed evidence code, was thus enacted in California in 1851.116 Soon
afterwards, Stephen J. Field was appointed to the state's highest court and later to the
federal Supreme Court. With the support of Walker and others influenced by the
nationalist jurisprudence urged by Sampson, Iowa and several other states west of the
Rockies followed California's lead in enacting the Field codes including the
postcolonial priest-penitent privilege.117
An even more highly abbreviated report ofPhilips was reprinted in the first volume
of the South-western Law Journal."8 This abstract was read by Simon Greenleaf, a
professor at Harvard Law School and at the time America's leading writer on the law
of evidence. In 1850, Greenleaf revised the fifth edition of his A Treatise on the Law of
Evidence, which he had first published eight years previously. He discussed the priest-
penitent privilege, concluding unpersuasively from the dubious Drake "decision" from
Massachusetts, various English and Irish authorities, and obviously anglocentric rather
than revolutionary American legal principles, that the priest-penitent evidentiary
privilege was not part of American law. However, Greenleaf acknowledged in
considerable detail that Roman law and French law held otherwise. Although he
dutifully cited Philips as the American authority for recognition of the privilege,
Greenleaf failed to note that Mayor Clinton's 1813 opinion was actually the only
American decision on point, so that its reasoning stood uncontested. Greenleaf's
anglocentric treatment presages that of other American evidentiary writers who seem
baffled by the priest-penitent privilege, unable to explain it historically, and unwilling
to confront its radical constitutional justifications. In a footnote, Greenleaf also set
forth in full New York's 1828 codification of that decision and noted that New York's
lead had already been followed by other states 19
In the same year that Greenleaf wrote A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, the New
York legal writer John Anthon was much less deferential to English authorities. Anthon
joined the Cincinnati jurist Timothy Walker in extolling Philips' departure from
colonial jurisprudence. Employing the postcolonial, nationalist legal rhetoric of
William Sampson, Anthon described Philips as "taking a step in enlightened morals far
in advance of our parent land," and he urged every state in the Union to follow the
116. Title XI of"An act to regulate proceedings in civil cases, in the Courts of Justice
of this State" (Apr. 29, 1851) provided:
A clergyman or a priest shall not, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as a witness as to any confession made to him in his
professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs.
An act to regulate proceedings in civil cases, in the Courts of Justice of this State, CAL. STAT.
ch. 1, 357 (1851) (codified at COMPILED LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 590 (1853)).
117. Lang, supra note 91, at 99-106, 115; 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, at
71 -74; William Wirt Blume, Adoption in California of the Field Code of Civil Procedure: A
Chapter in American Legal History, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 701 (1966); Developments in the Law:
Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 1458-60. See generally DAVID DUDLEY FIELD,
CENTENARY ESSAYS (Alison Reppy ed., 1949); WARREN, supra note 101, at 508-39.
118. People v. Phillips, 1 Sw. L.J. & REP. 90 (1844).
119. GREENLEAF, supra note 112, at 335 n.5.
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example set by it and New York's resulting 1828 statute. 12 Warmly, Anthon's
casebook on legal method warned the law student that, in the 30 states, American law
was being subjected to "an elaboration of a most expansive character, arising from new
social positions, under novel forms of government, demanding equally novel
applications of established rules and principles.'' 2
In the East, the priest-penitent privilege was contested in antebellum courtrooms,
rather than in legislative chambers. Unreported cases with novel applications of rules
and principles included those of Father Hickey in Baltimore in 1847; Father O'Neil
(who was fined by Judge Waldo) in New Haven, Connecticut in 1855; and Father L.
Young of Frankfort, Kentucky in 1868.122 In the only reported mid-century decision, a
Virginia court closely followed Philips in holding that the postcolonial priest-penitent
privilege was required by the state and federal constitutions.
123
In Commonwealth v. Cronin (1855), 124 Judge Meredith distinguished the Irish case
of Butler v. Moore (1802) on the ground that there the issue concerned a "confidential
communication" rather than a sacramental confession.'2 5 He found no English decision
actually on point. Judge Meredith relied heavily on Philips, which would not be
judicially cited again for another century, and he quoted in full its 1828 New York
codification. Much of Judge Meredith's opinion is a well-constructed collage, with
lengthy passages lifted directly from Mayor Clinton, Father Kohlmann's counsel, and
Jeremy Bentham. Evidently relying on Greenleaf, Judge Meredith noted that the New
York statute had been followed by other states of the Union and also that the clergy
privilege was recognized in Scotland. 1
26
III. THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
After the American Civil War, Sampson's The Catholic Question in America was
closely read by Ambrose Manahan, a Roman Catholic priest with a literary eye. I made
my acquaintance with the long-deceased Father Manahan by pure chance on a visit to
the rare books room in the library at Notre Dame University in South Bend, Indiana.
An entry in the catalogue suggested a strangely unfamiliar source. Closer investigation
revealed a beautifully typeset, printed and bound annotated 1867 reprint of Sampson's
120. JOHN ANTHON, THE LAW STUDENT, OR GUIDES TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW IN ITS
PRINCIPLES 217-18 (1850).
121. ld. at 5-6.
122. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES
580 (3d ed. 1888).
123. Id.
124. Cronin, I QUARTERLY L.J. at 135. 1 also discuss Cronin in Walsh, supra note 4, at
42-43.
125. Id. at 135; see also Butler v. Moore (Ire. Ch. 1802), reported in 2 JOHN SCHOALES
& THOMAS LEFROY, REPORT OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY IN IRELAND DURING THE TIME OF LORD REDESDALE 249.
126. Id. at 137. "By a writer on Scotch Criminal Law it is remarked: 'But our law
utterly disowns and attempt to make a clergyman of any religious persuasion whatever divulge
any confessions made to him in the course of religious visits, or for the sake of spiritual
consolation, as subversive of the great object of punishment, the reformation and improvement
of the offender."' R.S. Nolan, Seal of Confession, in 13 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 649, 660
(1912) (quoting ARCHIBALD ALISON, PRACTICE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND (1833)).
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1813 postcolonial classic report of Philips, The Catholic Question in America. As well
as Sampson's appendices, and some of the subsequent controversial literature that
Philips inspired, this impressive and apparently unread volume includes extensive
editorial annotations by Father Manahan such as a biography of Father Kohlmann. This
edited collection of materials on Philips is clearly a labor of love. The entire opening
volume of Father Manahan's announced new publishing venture Manahan 's American
Catholic Museum (New York 1867), consists of this expanded reprint of Philips.' 
27
Here's the curious bibliographical twist. Inscribed in pencil on the flyleaf is the
following poignant note:
This book was never published, and there were but six copies struck off, of which
this is the only one, I believe that was preserved. The author, Rev. Dr. Manahan,
died just as the book was being stereotyped, and as none of his relations saw fit to
pay the printer Mr. [illegible], for his work, he struck off six copies, one of which
was sent to me to see if I would purchase the plates. Not choosing to invest, the
plates were melted up by the printer. So this is a printed book that was never
published.
Nov. 1872 L. Kehoe
The publication of Father Manahan's 1867 annotated reprint might have rescued
Sampson's United Irish jurisprudential classic, The Catholic Question in America,
from falling into near total obscurity between the Civil War and the Second World
War. Nevertheless, the influence of Philips would still be quietly felt. Laying aside
Father Manahan's unpublished work, and although partial extracts or summaries
appeared in 1814, 1844, 1950, and 1955, it would not be until a 1974 facsimile edition
that William Sampson's rare and complete 1813 first edition of his report of Philips
would be reproduced in full.
Although Father Manahan's reprint of Philips never saw the light of day, the 1813
decision was not forgotten. In 1870, a Catholic historian recalled that the trial had
"excited a good deal of interest at the time, and led to a decision of much importance to
the Catholic community." He added that "[t]he decision, as well as the whole manner
in which the discussion was carried on, shows that a great change had taken place, not
only in the form of government, but in the dispositions and character of the people"
since colonial executions of suspected priests. 28 Soon afterwards, the first standard
history of Catholicism in the United States carried a similar account of the case and its
repercussions. 
29
Although Philips was apparently never judicially cited between the Civil War and
the Second World War, the priest-penitent privilege it announced was steadily gaining
national support. Maybe influenced by Stephen Field's early role in codifying the
Western priest-penitent privilege, soon after the Civil War the Philips principle won an
unexpected endorsement from the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
opinion was written by none other than Justice Field, who had codified the California
clergy privilege as a pioneer legislator just a couple of decades before.
127. MANAHAN, supra note 71.
128. BAYLEY, supra note 103, at 77-82.
129. SHEA, supra note 71, at 165-67.
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The question raised in Totten v. United States'30 was whether the government was
bound to a contract entered into by the President for secret service behind Confederate
lines. Holding the contract valid but unenforceable, the Court explained that there are
some matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will
not allow the confidence to be violated.131 Without citation, Justice Field matter-of-
factly added that, on the same principle, suits cannot be maintained which would
require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional. The court also offered the
husband-wife, attorney-client, and physician-patient privileges as similar examples.'
32
Jacob Yellin contends that this friendly pronouncement from the Supreme Court in
Totten shows that the recognition of the clergy privilege was being accomplished at
that time in the general absence of a statute, and despite a general notion that no such
privilege existed at common law.' 33 Yellin overlooks the possible further influence of
Justice Field's earlier personal role in codifying the California clergy privilege. Indeed,
Justice Field learned at a very young age the importance of religious tolerance, by
observing the Catholics of Smyrna where his father was stationed as a Protestant
missionary. 134
More significantly, the nineteenth-century, evidentiary writer Francis Wharton
contemporaneously observed the persistent rise of the posteolonial clergy privilege. In
his Law of Evidence, Wharton described the clergy privilege as "much agitated.' 35 He
repeated his statement from two earlier editions that no such privilege existed under the
English common law, and acknowledged that it is hard to reconcile with the court's
search for the truth. "But, however this may be," continued Wharton, "there is a strong
present current of opinion in favor of granting this privilege to priests of communions
in which the confessional is part of an obligatory religious system."'
136
In contrast to his imperial precursor Greenleaf, and despite the contrary arguments,
Wharton himself seems to have been swept along on that postcolonial, Sampsonian
current. He asserted that on several occasions, the clergy privilege had been denied to
Roman Catholic priests both in England and the United States. "At the same time,"
wrote Wharton, "prosecuting officers properly shrink from calling upon priests to
disclose confessions as evidence against parties on trial for crimes; and eminent judges
have gone a great way in encouraging this reluctance."' 37 Wharton quoted dicta from
English judges friendly to the privilege and cited Philips, Farnandis, and Cronin in a
130. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). See also Walsh, supra note 4.
131. Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
132. Id.
133. Yellin, supra note 106, at 107.
134. CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 16 (University
of Chicago Press, photo. reprint 1963) (1930).
135. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES
580 (3d ed. 1888).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 581. Almost identical remarks about professional reticence and judicial
discomfort with the general rule in England were made by the Victorian jurist, Lord Chief
Justice Coleridge, in a letter to Gladstone. 2 ERNEST HARTLEY COLERIDGE, LIFE &
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN DuKE LORD COLERIDGE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND 364-65
(1904).
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footnote. Then he set forth in full, in the body of his text, the language of New York's
1828 codification of Philips.3 '
Of the nineteenth-century evidentiary treatise writers, perhaps the clergy privilege's
most enthusiastic supporter was William Best, whose first edition was published in
England in 1849. Carried to the United States in James Morgan's first American
edition, Best's Law ofEvidence (1878) began by describing this as "a question of some
difficulty, despite what was commonly thought." 139 Without quoting a single judicial
utterance against the privilege, Best methodically distinguished away almost every
such English and Irish decision, including specifically the two precedents that Mayor
Clinton had expressly repudiated in Philips: "How far a particular form of religious
belief being disfavored by law at the period (A.D. 1802) affected the decision in Butler
v. Moore is not easy to say: but both that case and R. v. Sparkes leave the general
question untouched.
1 40
Best concluded emphatically that the early English common law recognized the
privilege, and questioned Lord Coke's early seventeenth-century limitation to
confessions not involving high treason. Best argued for an expansive interpretation of
the modem clergy privilege: "If it be error to refuse to hold sacred the communications
made to spiritual advisers, an opposite and greater error is the attempt to confine the
privilege to the clergy of some particular creed.",1 4 1 Borrowing from Greenleaf, Best
prominently set forth in his text Philips' 1828 New York codification, as had Wharton.
However, Best's American editor James Morgan was less thorough. Evidently relying
on Greenleaf s influential but misleading treatise, Morgan threw in an obligatory
citation to the South-western Law Journal's abstract of Philips. Declaring himself
unable to locate that secondary report, Morgan misread Greenleaf's passing reference
and mistakenly identified Philips as a rejection of the clergy privilege!
In a quiet revolution in postcolonial jurisprudence, the increasing ascendancy of
Philips' priest-penitent privilege was manifest by the close of the nineteenth century.
By 1892, when Greenleaf's nephew edited the fifteenth edition of that three-volume
treatise, his new preface listed the clergy privilege among the "subjects which have
been affected most materially in the period covered by the new matter of this
edition. 1 42 The statement that confessions to priests and clergymen are not privileged
"was undoubtedly the rule at the time the author wrote, and is still the rule at common
law; but in a large number of States the rule has been changed by statutory
enactments., 143 Although, in the style of old-fashioned anglocentric jurisprudence, the
new Greenleaf text continued to overlook the constitutional dimensions of Philips, it
duly set forth most of the ensuing legislation codifying the priest penitent privilege.
Under Californian influence, the eight antebellum states, New York, South Carolina,
Missouri, Michigan, Wisconsin, California, Iowa, and Virginia, had since been joined
138. WHARTON, supra note 135, at 581-82.
139.2 W.M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLESOF THELAWOF EViDENCE §§ 583-85 (J. Morgan ed.,
1878).
140. Id. § 583.
141. Id. § 585.
142. Simon GreenleafCroswell, Preface to 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-2 (Simon GreenleafCroswell ed., 15th ed., Boston 1892).
143. Id. at 333, 335-36 & n.(a).
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by the seven western codifying legislatures of Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Ohio and Utah-making a total of fifteen states in all.
14
Under these proliferating exemption statutes, nineteenth-century reports ofjudicial
decisions became more frequent. In contrast to Philips, which considered the existence
of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege, later conflicts construed protective state
statutes to determine their scope. Such interpretive disputes began in New York
(1835),' Indiana (1877),146 California (1880),147 Iowa (1895),14s and Missouri
(1900).149
IV. THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
By the turn of the century, therefore, Philips' recognition of an American clergy
privilege had already gained considerable judicial, statutory, scholarly, and popular
endorsement. Just as Philips took its principal nineteenth-century impetus from New
York's 1828 codification, its postcolonial, American evidentiary rule grew in the
twentieth through the academic writer John Henry Wigmore's widely influential
scholarship. In 1904, Wigmore began publishing the first of numerous editions of his
authoritative multi-volume treatise on the law of evidence. He eventually devoted one
entire volume to the problem of evidentiary privileges, showing that overriding social
and jurisprudential policies can justify limitations on the trial court's quest for truth. 5 °
Among many substantial theoretical contributions to the law of evidence, Wigrnore
rationalized all privileged communications by identifying four utilitarian common
criteria for their recognition. 151 Dean Wigmore's comprehensive work was soon
recognized as a classic, and became the starting point for countless American judicial
discussions of evidentiary questions. Because of Wigmore's undeniable significance,
his treatment critically shaped, and in important respects warped, the conventional
modem understanding of the clergy privilege.
144. Id. at 335-37 & n.(a). During the nineteenth century, no eastern state followed
New York in codifying the clergy privilege. The codification story raises interesting questions
concerning the frontier as a formative element in American legal development. See generally
William Wirt Blume, Civil Procedure on the American Frontier, 56 MICH. L. REv. 161 (1957);
William Wirt Blume, Legislation on the American Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962);
William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Brown, Territorial Courts andLaw, 61 MICH. L. REV. 39 (Part
I), 467 (Part II) (1962); CHARLES M. HEPBURN, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING
(1897).
145. People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311 (1835).
146. Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881); Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877); Dahlev
v. State, 53 N.E. 850 (1899).
147. In re Toomes, 54 Cal. 509 (1880).
148. State v. Brown, 64 N.W. 277 (1895).
149. Martin v. Bowdem, 59 S.W. 227 (1900).
150. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore's third edition was
published in 1940, shortly before the author's death. The most recent edition is McNaughton's
1961 revision.
151.5 id. § 2285.
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In what McCormick described as his "seemingly grudging acceptance" of the clergy
privilege, 52 Wigmore declared that it met his four canons. Such communications were
made in confidence, essential to the relationship between clergy and congregant, whose
relationship was socially fostered, and breach of the confidence would do more social
harm than litigating with incomplete evidence. "On the whole, then," Dean Wigmore
concluded, "this privilege has adequate grounds for recognition."'
5 3
Wigmore's historical treatment of the postcolonial clergy privilege was
unimpressive. He seems to have been somewhat mesmerized by a line of hostile but
inconclusive and contested statements in the English decisions. Wigmore passed
quickly and uneasily over the general consensus that a priest-penitent privilege existed
in the early English common law. 154 Then he made the completely unsupported
assertion that "since the Restoration, and for more than two centuries of English
practice, the almost unanimous expression of judicial opinion (including at least two
decisive rulings) has denied the existence of a privilege. ' 55 In fact, Wigmore's
footnotes are at war with his text; his handling of both the early and modem English
precedent on the clergy privilege was deeply unreliable.' 
56
More conspicuously, Wigmore's anglocentric treatment of the constitutional and
common-law American precedent was flat wrong. He compounded the shoddy history
of Greenleaf and Morgan, Best's American editor. Wharton did better, but not by
much. Wigmore's entire discussion of Philips amounts to a curt acknowledgment that
the priest-penitent privilege "was recognized in an inferior court in New York."
' ' 57
Although he cited Timothy Walker's heavily abridged abstract, Wigmore's vague
dating "1820 circa" betrays his unfamiliarity with Philips and suggests that he never
even set eyes on that secondary source! Nor did Wigmore study William Sampson's
much more comprehensive original report in The Catholic Question in America
(1813). His lack of familiarity with the leading American decision on the priest-
penitent privilege is further betrayed by a confusing parenthetical to the later Smith
case, in which Wigmore seems to mistakenly assert that Justice Van Ness relied on
some other unidentified opinion by Mayor Clinton. Critically, Wigmore offered no hint
of the pioneering, postcolonial constitutional and common-law reasoning of Philips.
Omitting vital jurisprudential context, Wigmore made no reference to the historical
context of Philips, its hibernian ethnic dimension, the striking role of its advocate and
reporter Sampson (an Irish Protestant imprisoned, banished, and disbarred for
demanding religious equality in his anti-Catholic homeland), or its prompt and heavily
influential codification by New York.158
Compounding his anglocentric dismissal of the postcolonial, American priest-
penitent privilege, Wigmore cites Drake for the emphatic proposition that the clergy
privilege was "early denied in Massachusetts. ' 59 This statement is also wrong.
152. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 76.2 (5th ed. 1999).
153. WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 2396.
154. For a discussion of that scholarship, see supra Part III.
155. WIGMORE, supra note 150, at 229 nn.4-6.
156. For a more detailed criticism of Wiginore's discussion of English legal history on
the clergy privilege, see infra Part III.
157. WIGMORE, supra note 150, at 229 n.7.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Wigmore neglects to point out that in Drake the State never questioned the existence of
the privilege, nor did the Massachusetts court ever issue any opinion actually
addressing the issue. Apparently conceding the underlying principle, the State argued
that Drake's communal confession was not required by the rules of his congregation
and was therefore gratuitous and unprotected; moreover, Drake's confession was made
to fellow Protestant congregants, who raised no conscientious objection to testifying,
as opposed to a clergyman like Father Kohlmann who was bound to guard the secret
with his life. In its unexplained rejection of Drake's claim, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court may well have been swayed by either or both of these critical facts. Wigmore
wanders beyond dramatic overstatement when he describes Drake as an American
decision that "denied" the priest-penitent privilege, rather than one that merely defined
its reach, like Smith.
Here would be a more accurate historical rendering of the postcolonial, American
precedents that Wigmore relegated to a defeated footnote: Philips established the
clergy privilege on postcolonial common-law and constitutional foundations, giving
rise to a powerful codification movement; Smith accepted the privilege in principle but
insisted that it be applied objectively in light of church tenets; and Drake was simply
inconclusive. Thus, Wigmbre's own incomplete sources belie his opening assertion
that the privilege had not been judicially recognized in the United States.160 In truth,
since Philips, no American court has ever denied the existence of the clergy privilege.
Exacerbating his unconvincing treatment of postcolonial, American precedent
supporting the priest-penitent privilege, Wigmore neglects to mention other American
judicial precedents that actually required the clergy privilege: explicit affirmations of
Philips by South Carolina's Chancellor Desaussure in Farnandis and by Virginia's
Judge Meredith in Cronin, and even an unequivocal federal endorsement from Justice
Field's United States Supreme Court in Totten. Wigmore never hinted, as Philips and
Cronin had explicitly held, that postcolonial, American state and federal religious
freedom guarantees put the clergy privilege on a constitutional footing unlike that in
England.1
61
As if to make amends for his unimpressive treatment of American judicial authority,
Wigmore's next section was a detailed recitation of the numerous statutes that Philips
had inspired through its influential 1828 New York codification. Wigmore did not
identify the powerful comparative judicial and legislative influence of New York, and
later California, which provided the two statutory variations of the postcolonial clergy
privilege. Writing in his second edition of 1923, Wigmore reported that "[i]n two
jurisdictions of Canada and in more than one half of the jurisdictions of the United
States the privilege has been sanctioned by statute."' 162 In detail, he set forth the
provisions of all those enactments. Adding to Greenleaf's list from three decades
earlier, Wigmore added fourteen new priest-penitent privilege statutes passed by
Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming, making a
total of 27 states and 4 territories including Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, and
Puerto Rico. He also noted similar statutes in the Canadian provinces of Newfoundland
160. Id. § 2394.
161. See People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, supra note
2, at 95-114; Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855).
162. WiGMORE, supra note 150, § 2395.
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and Quebec.1 63 In 1940, in his third edition, published during the Second World War,
Wigmore added new state priest-penitent statutes in Louisiana and West Virginia, as
well as in the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone-making a total of 29 states and 6
federal territories.' 
6 4
Turning to the policy of the privilege, Wigmore noted that "[e]ven by Bentham, the
greatest opponent of privileges," the clergy privilege was deemed worthy of
recognition. 165 Wigmore set forth and adopted a lengthy abstract from the Rationale of
Judicial Evidence (1827), in which Bentham justified the priest-penitent privilege by
saying that "with any idea of [religious] toleration, a coercion of this nature is
altogether inconsistent and incompatible."' 66 Wigmore then proceeded to apply his
own four canons for the recognition of confidential communications and found that
they were met.' 67 On policy grounds, he therefore concluded that the priest-penitent
privilege should be recognized; and his approval holds absent legislative recognition.
Curiously, a careful reading of Wigmore therefore yields an interpretation directly
the opposite of that most frequently attributed to him. While Wigmore ultimately
endorsed the clergy privilege, he is constantly cited for the contrary idea that the clergy
privilege is purely statutory in nature and unsupported by common-law reasoning.'
68
Wigmore must shoulder some of the blame for this confusion regarding his ultimate
position. His reductionist and inaccurate history of both English and American judicial
precedent was unfortunately preceded by the absolutist and misleading heading:
History: No Privilege at Common Law.169 In an abject failure to start from the most
basic postcolonial premises of American jurisprudence, at no point does Wignore
mention either state or federal constitutional provisions.
Thus, although Wigmore's ultimate approval undoubtedly strengthened the modem,
postcolonial Irish-American clergy privilege originally announced in Philips, it did so
at the expense of much historical and jurisprudential complexity. As Professor Louisell
has pointed out, "[i]t may be that Wigmore, despite his monumental contribution to the
law of privileges, has conduced to the current confusion by his emphasis on strictly
utilitarian bases for the privileges, bases which are sometimes highly conjectural and
defy scientific validation."' 7 °
Nevertheless, other writers continued to draw inspiration from Sampson's report of
Philips. In 1916, Edward J. McGuire wrote that "Sampson's argument in this case is
alive with eloquence, strength, and courage. It supports with inexorable logic true
163. Id. § 2395.
164. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL
JURISDICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 2395 (3d ed. 1940),
165. WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 2396.
166. 9 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, pt. 2, ch. 6 (1827),
reproduced in 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 366-67 (John Bowring ed.,
Edinburgh, William Tait 1843).
167. For ajudicial application of Wigmore's four canons, see the discussion of Cook v.
Carroll immediately following.
168. Callahan, supra note 13, at 349; Kuhlmann, supra note 53, at 266; Yellin, supra
note 106, at 102-03.
169. WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 2394.
170. Louisell, supra note 8, at 111.
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religious liberty." 171 In 1935, Ryan described Philips as a "famous trial.', 172 From the
defeat of Governor Al Smith in the presidential primary, to the controversial election of
John F. Kennedy as the United States' first and only Catholic president, Philips
continued to be cited as a rare early counterexample to rampant religious intolerance
against equal civil rights for American Roman Catholics.
173
V. THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
At the end of the Second World War, the historicist case for the postcolonial clergy
privilege resurfaced with startling clarity. More than a century after William
Sampson's death, Wigmore's text repatriated the Irish-American clergy privilege
across the Atlantic to overthrow the English common law that Sampson attacked so
relentlessly both before and after his banishment. In the meantime, the modem Irish
Republic had emerged like a phoenix from the disastrous Easter Rising of 1916.
Similarly shaping postcolonial constitutionalism, Judge Gavan Duffy of the Irish High
Court echoed Mayor De Witt Clinton's holding that a Roman Catholic priest could not
be forced to testify.
174
In Ireland, the priest-penitent issue in postcolonial jurisprudence resurfaced in the
case of Cook v. Carroll (1945). 175 Ironically, although he was heavily influenced by the
statutory codification of Philips in the United States, nothing in Wigniore alerted Judge
Gavan Duffy to that neglected American decision's direct, historic implications for
hibemocentric postcolonial jurisprudence. Thus, the priest-penitent issue was posed a
century apart and in a sharply contrasting cultural context. Just like his Jeffersonian
American counterpart Mayor De Witt Clinton, Judge Duffy worked from first
principles, breathing interpretive life into a recently-crafted constitution, and laying the
jurisprudential foundations of a newly independent postcolonial republic. Like Mayor
Clinton in Philips, in deciding Cook, Judge Duffy found his way blocked by the newly-
vulnerable English common law of evidence.
"In order to ascertain the true juristic principle," Judge Duffy resorted to the 1940
edition of Wigmore's "monumental work on the Anglo-American System of
Evidence."' 176 He mentioned Sir William Holdsworth's description of that treatise as "a
classic," observing also that it was "hardly known in Ireland, where English textbooks
on evidence hold the field" (and adding that none was comparable). 177 In Cook, Judge
Duffy was explicit in his considerable debt to Wigmore's comparative influence, even
throwing in biographical detail 78 about the great scholar's career. From Wigmore's
treatise, Judge Duffy learned that in other countries the penitential privilege was widely
recognized. He specifically relied on the numerous statutory codifications inspired by
171. Edward J. McGuire, William Sampson, 15 J. AM. IRISH HIST. Soc. 342, 343 (1916).
172. RYAN, supra note 67, at 11l. See also PETER GUILDAY, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
JOHN CARROLL 116-33, 556 (1922); GusTAvus MYERS, HISTORY OFBIGOTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES 118-22 (1945).
173. MICHAEL SCHWARTZ, THE PERSISTENT PREJUDICE 36 (1984).
174. Cook v. Carroll, [1945] I.R. 515 (Ir. H. Ct.).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 520.
177. Id. (quoting 59 L.Q.R. 289 (1943)).
178. Id. at 520.
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Philips: "Catholics and their sympathisers have been strong enough to get laws passed
in most of the Legislatures of the United States declaring the privilege of silence for the
secrets of the confessional ... .""9 He praised such statutes for extending the privilege
to every religious denomination. He recommended the passage of a similar statute by
the Irish Parliament, for in the absence of legislative direction judges might differ on
the extent of the privilege'
8
Judge Duffy felt that the influential American scholar John Henry Wigmore
examined this development of the sacerdotal privilege in many jurisdictions "from a
rather adverse standpoint."' 8' Nevertheless, he gratefully accepted "the learned jurist's
penetrating analysis" in Wigmore's four canons for testing whether a communication
should be privileged.182 After quoting those canons in full, Judge Duffy proceeded to
apply them one by one. In Judge Duffy's view, Wigmore's utilitarian canons applied
"as neatly as if they had been made to Father Behan's order."' t 83 Judge Duffy held:
Accordingly, the privilege requisite to secure testimonial immunity to the parish
priest in this case is one in which the four conditions predicated by Wigmore are
all present. It follows that Father Behan was within his legal right in refusing to
divulge the conversation as a witness, unless I am to be precluded by very
questionable adverse pre-Treaty precedent and the absence of any precedent in our
own Courts.184
Judge Duffy articulated a broad constitutional clergy privilege, not confined to
sacramental confessions, and implicitly nondenominational.
The postcolonial Irish decision in Cook was later influential upon the American
clergy privilege because it was showcased with extensive extracts in Wigmore's
treatise as a leading judicial precedent in support of the privilege, the role in which
Philips had been conspicuously omitted from Dean Wigrnore's earlier editions.185 After
the Second World War, aided by Judge Duffy's Irish opinion in Cook, William
Sampson's early postcolonial clergy privilege spread quickly throughout the remaining
United States. During that same period, Philips enjoyed a remarkable American
renaissance, earning recognition from prominent non-Catholic writers. In 1943,
Gustavus Myers described it as "a precedent of immense importance. ' 8 In 1950,
finally making Sampson's 1813 masterpiece accessible to modern readers, Anson
Phelps Stokes reprinted extensive extracts from the arguments and opinion, in a full
chapter devoted to Philips in his three-volume work on church and state in the United
States.'" 7
179. Id. at 518.
180. Id. at 518-19.
181. Id. at 520.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 521.
184. Id. at 522.
185. See WIGMORE, supra note 150, § 2394.
186. MYERS, supra note 172, at 122.
187. 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 788-90, 838-
50 (1950); 3 id. at 452.
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Accelerating the rediscovery of Philips, in 1955, Mayor Clinton's opinion (but not
the entire report) was reproduced in full for the first time since Sampson's The
Catholic Question in America. It was extracted from the original 1813 law report by an
anonymous historian since identified as Tinnelly. Although Mayor Clinton's complete
opinion improved upon McGroarty's 1844 summary, and complemented Stokes'
extensive 1950 extracts, Tinnelly's 1955 opinion does not reproduce the proceedings,
the arguments of counsel, or the original appendices, thus, it is not a substitute for
Sampson's authentic 1813 report.
In the heading of Tinnelly's 1955 extract, Mayor Clinton's opinion is accurately
attributed to its source, but a footnote stating that Sampson's original 1813 report was
"later reprinted" by Walker seems to have encouraged many legal researchers to
continue citing to McGroarty's abbreviated 1844 abstract as the original, or an
acceptable substitute. This oversight is inexcusable, especially as the brief 1844
abstract is obviously not the source of Tinnelly's 1955 reproduction of Mayor
Clinton's opinion. Tinnelly also added extracts from Smith.18 These excerpts, he
explained, "reflect[] the great contribution of American legal thought to the growth of
genuine freedom of conscience."' 89 In a few brief concluding remarks, Tinnelly's
survey noted the 1828 adoption of the New York statute codifying Philips, and the
many American jurisdictions to which the idea had since spread.' 90 Despite continuing
bibliographical confusion, Tinnelly's 1955 reprint of Mayor Clinton's opinion revived
a considerable scholarly and judicial interest in Philips.
By the end of the 1950s, Mayor Clinton's newly republished opinion in Philips, its
1828 New York codification, and Judge Duffy's recent decision in Cook all combined
to influence a significant federal court decision. In Mullen v. United States (1959),9'
without statutory guidance and without explicit reference to the federal Free Exercise
Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
declared that "[s]ound policy-reason and experience--concedes to religious liberty a
rule of evidence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent's
confidential confession to him, at least absent the penitent's consent."' 92 Extending
Philips beyond Smith, the court ruled inadmissible the testimony of a Lutheran minister
who was willing to break the confidence reposed in him.
Conspicuous in the impressive scholarly bibliographical appendix to the Mullen
court's decision is Tinnelly's 1955 reprint of Mayor Clinton's full opinion, and in his
opinion for the court Judge Fahy also cites to McGroarty's brief 1844 abstract. The
Mullen court's bibliography also includes New York's 1828 codification of Philips,
and Judge Duffy's Irish decision in Cook.' 93 Judges Fahy and Edgerton, who decided
188. People v. Smith, 2 Roger's N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer& Term. 1817),
reproduced in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 779 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914).
189. Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 199.
190. Id. at 213.
191. 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1959). I also discuss Mullen in my article The First Free
Exercise Case, supra note 4.
192. Mullen, 263 F.2d at 280.
193. Id. at 281. The Mullen bibliography also included a citation to Edward A. Hogan,
Jr., A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6 Loy. L.REv. 1 (1951). In his
article, Hogan set forth a lucid account of the priest-penitent's recognition in the early English
common law, and argued for its further extension. Hogan had failed to discover Philips and
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Mullen, were almost certainly the first judges to read the unedited text of the Philips
opinion since Judge Meredith before the Civil War.
The Mullen court was bound only by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which left it free to determine the existence of the clergy privilege "by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience."1 94 It noted American dicta in favor of the privilege,
including the comment of Justice Field in Totten and a more recent endorsement of that
view by Learned Hand, an influential modem jurist.195 These decisions, according to
Judge Fahy, correctly assumed the existence of the clergy privilege.
Historically, Judge Fahy followed Cook in concluding that the priest-penitent
privilege was part of early English common law, but was abrogated or abandoned
sometime after the Reformation, during a period "when religious and political tensions
largely set the pattern in such matters . ,,196 In determining whether the clergy
privilege should be recognized in modem America, the Court declared that if reason
and experience recommended the privilege, "the dead hand of the common law will not
restrain such recognition."1 97 In answering that question, the Court acknowledged that
it "rel[ied] heavily" on Wigmore's lengthy discussion, and concluded that his four
canons applied.19
[NIon-recognition of the privilege at certain periods in the development of the
common law was inconsistent with the basic principles of the common law. It
would be no service to the common law to perpetuate in its name a rule of
evidence which is inconsistent with the foregoing fundamental guides [Wigmore's
four canons] furnished by that law.
199
The Mullen court then recognized the underground authority of Philips, the
constitutional test case that had first pressed the clergy privilege in the United States.
"As we have seen," wrote Judge Fahy, citing both Philips and Wigmore, "the denial
was never uniform or resolute, so strong were the claims of reason in support of the
privilege." 200 He added that in the modem climate of religious freedom, the federal
courts must recognize the clergy privilege as "a rule of evidence on this subject
dictated by sound policy."20 1 This homage was the first judicial recognition of Philips
since the forgotten Cronin decision a century before. Although First Amendment
principles seem implicit in his discussion, Judge Fahy never explicitly mentions the
United States Constitution.
erroneously asserted that from the earliest days in America courts had denied the priest-penitent
privilege.
194. Mullen, 263 F.2d at 278 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (1944) (repealed in 1972)).
The rule borrows its wording from Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934).
195. Mullen, 263 F.2d at 278 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875);
McMann v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937); United States v. Keeney,
11l F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C.), rev 'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 279.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 280. Thus, the Mullen court followed Cook in recognizing the full
implications of Wigmore's analysis.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Judge Edgerton added his view that "a communication made in reasonable
confidence that it will not be disclosed, and in such circumstances that disclosure is
shocking to the moral sense of the community, should not be disclosed in a judicial
proceeding," regardless of whether the trusted person is minister, wife, husband, doctor
or lawyer.20 2 He borrowed the words of Justice Holmes, who thought it "a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part.,,203
In 1955, Tinnelly's research revealed that thirty states had statutes codifying the
Philips clergy privilege, and that it had been recognized as state common law in
Pennsylvania.2 04 He overlooked other favorable antebellum South Carolina decisions in
Farnandis2t t and Cronin.
2 0 6
In one sense, the pace of modem codification had slowed, with New Jersey's being
the only new enactment during the 1940s. In another, the impetus had intensified, as
serious efforts were now underway to ensure the clergy privilege's uniform recognition
throughout the United States. In 1942, the American Law Institute adopted Rule 219 of
the Model Code of Evidence, which the American Bar Association and the National
Conference on Uniform State Laws incorporated in 1953 as Rule 29 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence. 7 This proposed national rule was far more cumbersome than any
of the state statutes, which were based either on New York's 1828 codification of
Philips, or on David and Stephen Field's 1851 California reformulation of the early
New York priest-penitent privilege. Although the wording of the modem uniform rule
did not prove popular, its mere existence prompted many more state priest-penitent
statutes, both directly and indirectly.
20 8
Remarkably, during the decade beginning with the adoption of Rule 29 and ending
with the Supreme Court's recognition of religious exemptions in Sherbert v. Verner
(1963),209 no fewer than 14 legislatures passed priest-penitent statutes, bringing the
total to 44 states and 4 territories (including a Pennsylvanian common-law privilege).
The new states codifying Philips' posteolonial clergy privilege were Georgia in 1954;
Maryland in 1957; South Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Florida in 1960 (the
year in which John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the first Roman Catholic leader of the
United States); Delaware and Illinois in 1961; and Massachusetts and Virginia in
1962.21
202. Id. at 281 (Edgerton, J., concurring).
203. Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
204. Shortly after Wigmore published his third edition, and a year before his death, a
lower court in Pennsylvania appeared to recognize the privilege in passing as a matter of
common law. Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 213 (citing In re Shaeffer's Estate,
52 Dauph. 45 (Pa. Orph. 1942)).
205. For more discussion of Farnandis, see Walsh, supra note 4, at 41.
206. For more discussion of Cronin, see Walsh, supra note 4, at 42-43.
207. See generally Reese, supra note 106, at 63.
208. Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 288-89; Reese, supra note 106, at 58, 62-63, 84;
Yellin, supra note 106, at 139-41.
209. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This case is also discussed in Walsh, supra note 4, at 54-55.
210. Reese, supra note 106, at 58.
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In this modem codification process, despite the postcolonial clergy privilege's roots
in multicultural New York, the original colonies were generally among the last to
afford it statutory recognition, belatedly following the progressive postcolonial lead of
western legislatures. By 1963, the only staunchly anglocentric states without a clergy
privilege were the three New England states of Connecticut, Maine, and New
Hampshire; the two Southern states of Alabama and Mississippi; and Texas in the
Southwest. Eighty-nine per cent of the American population lived in states with a
clergy privilege.
2 11
In the words of Seward Reese, writing in the same year that President Kennedy was
assassinated, and that the United States Supreme Court adopted Philips' broader
principle of constitutional exemptions, William Sampson's hibemocentric, posteolonial
clergy privilege had already become "deeply embedded in American jurisprudence."
212
In addition to Philips' antebellum judicial influence, roughly half of the forty-four state
legislatures had borrowed their provisions almost word for word from that decision's
1828 codification by New York state; most other state statutes followed the Field
brothers' 1851 California rewording of that original New York codification of Philips.
Significantly, Reese's article simply asserted the existence of the postcolonial clergy
privilege and went straight to its various applications. This dramatic shift in
jurisprudential assumptions is a marked feature of the substantial legal scholarship that
213has grown around the clergy privilege since the Second World War. Perhaps
211. Reese, supra note 106, at 60.
212. Id. See also Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287-88.
213. See JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM HAROLD TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW (3d. ed. 1989); JOHN T. MCNEILL, A HISTORY OF THE CURE OF
SOULS 220 (1951); The Seal of Confessional, in 4 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 134 (1967);
Michael James Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328,
336-37 (1976); Simone Cambell, Catholic Sisters, Irregularly Ordained Women and the Clergy
Privilege, 9 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 523 (1976); Hogan, supra note 193; Knapp & Van de Creek,
Privileged Communication for Pastoral Counseling: Fact or Fancy?, 39 J. Pastoral Care 293
(1985); Kuhlmann, supra note 106; J.R. Lindsay, Privileged Communications (Part 1) -
Communications with Spiritual Advisers, 13 No. IR. L.Q. 160 (1959); Privileged
Communications, supra note 104; Reese, supra note 106; Robert L. Stoyles, The Dilemma of
the Constitutionality of the Priest-PenitentPrivilege---TheApplicability of the Religion Clauses,
29 U. PITT. L. REV. 27 (1967); Yellin, supra note 106; Note, The Clergyman: His Privileges and
Liabilities, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 323 (1960); Stephen H. Anderson, Note, Confidential
Relationships: Does the Law Require Silence Outside the Courtroom?, 6 UTAH L. REV. 380
(1958); Annotation, Matters to which the Privilege Covering Communications to Clergyman or
Spiritual Adviser Extends, 71 A.L.R. 3d 794 (1976); Erwin S. Barbe, Annotation, Who Is
"Clergyman " or the Like Entitled to Assert Privilege Attaching to Communication to
Clergymen or SpiritualAdvisers, 49 A.L.R. 3d 1205 (1973); 97 C.J.S, Witnesses § 263 (1957);
G. H. Fischer, Annotation, Matters to which the Privilege Covering Communications to
Clergyman or Spiritual Adviser Extends, 22 A.L.R. 2d 1152 (1952); 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses §§
531-32 (1948); 70 C.J. Witnesses § 615 (1935); Augsburger, Legal Concerns of the Pastoral
Counselor, 29 PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 109 (1980); 21 N.Y.S. BAR BULL. 288 (1949); Dean M.
Kelley, Beyond the Priest-Penitent Privilege: The Church, the FBI and Privacy, CHRISTIANITY
AND CRISIS, February 20, 1978, at 28; Robert E. Regan & John T. McCartney, Professional
Secrecy and Privileged Communications, CATHOLIC LAWYER, January 1956, at 3; Sacerdotal
Privilege in English Law, THE LAW TIMES, May 25, 1956, at 268; Michael Clay Smith, The
Pastor on the Witness Stand: Toward a Religious Privilege in the Court, CATHOLIC LAWYER,
Winter 1984, at 1; D. Jones, Privileged Communications with Clergy in the United States-An
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capturing the very moment that William Sampson's hibemocentric postcolonial
jurisprudence ultimately triumphed over rival anglocentric legal principles inherited
from the colonial regime, the priest-penitent privilege's general acceptance in the
United States seems to have first been assumed (that is, neither doubted nor denied) in
Tinnelly's editorial commentary setting forth his 1955 reprint of Mayor Clinton's
opinion.4 A few years later, in McNaughton's 1961 revision of Wigmore, extensive
extracts from Judge Duffy's opinion in Cook and Judge Fahy's opinion in Mullen
appear. McNaughton also cleaned up Wigmore's sloppy footnotes and added his own
bibliography of scholarly articles on the privilege. 215 Rather than relegating Philips to a
defeated footnote, as did their nineteenth-century precursors, modem legal historians
typically open their discussions with it.
216
In 1974, a major event in the bibliographical history of Philips took place. A
complete and widely available facsimile reprint of Sampson's The Catholic Question
in America was published in the series Civil Liberties in American History under the
editorial supervision of Leonard Levy.21 7 In belated place of Reconstruction-era
Ambrose Manahan's beautifully printed but unpublished book, this modem facsimile
edition made Sampson's now extremely rare original report, including the full
proceedings, counsel's arguments, and Sampson's appendices, generally available for
the first time since its original publication in 1813. However, Levy's 1974 edition did
not eliminate the prevailing bibliographical confusion, which continues to result in
misplaced scholarly and judicial reliance on McGroarty's brief summary of 1844,
Stokes' extracts of 1950, and the Catholic Lawyer's reprinted opinion of 1955.
Reporter William Sampson's deliberate choice of an accurate and expansive title for
his work aimed at a wide audience, playing down the formal case name People v.
Philips, compounded by inadequate attribution by later editors, evidently deflected the
Analytical Study of the Laws of Each State, Territory and Protectorate Concerning Such
Privileged Communications (April 16, 1979) (unpublished Doctor of Ministry dissertation
available in San Francisco Theological Seminary Library); A. Robert Thiebault, Are Your
Communications Privileged? (1958) (report by D.C. bar member to Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs), cited in Reese, supra note 106, at 59 n. 19; Rupert D. H. Bursell, The Seal of
the Confessional, 2 Ecc. L. J. 84 (1990); Faye A. Silas, Embattled Clergy: Is Confession Always
Private, ABA J., Feb. 1986, at 36.
For literature discussing clergy privilege in context of child abuse reporting statutes,
see infra note 225.
For literature discussing clergy privilege in context of particular states, see generally,
William E. Hurley, Privileged Communications in Oregon, 36 OR. L. REv. 132 (1957); J.
Michael Medina, Note, Evidence: "Is There a Time to Keep Silence? "-The Priest-Penitent
Privilege in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 258 (1974); Herbert L. Moody, Jr., Note, The Priest-
Penitent Privilege in South Carolina-Background and Development, 12 S.C. L. Q. 440 (1960);
Thomas W. Taylor, Note, Evidence-Privileged Communication-The New North Carolina
Priest-Penitent Statute, 46 N.C. L. Rev. 427 (1968); Note, Testimonial Privilege and
Competency in Indiana, 27 IND. LJ. 256 (1952).
214. Privileged Communications, supra note 104.
215. See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE & JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2394 (4th ed 1961).
216. Callahan, supra note 13, at 333-37; Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 267; Michael
W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1410, 1410-12, 1504-05, 1513 (1990); Reese, supra note 106, at 57; Privileged
Communications, supra note 104, at 199-209; Yellin, supra note 106, at 95, 104-05.
217. SAMPSON, supra note 2.
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attention of both legal scholars and jurists from his original 1813 report of Philips,
which has generally been familiar only to historians of the American Catholic
experience. In keeping with other titles in this valuable reprint series, Levy's 1974
facsimile edition lacks any modem introduction, thus foregoing the opportunity to
point out that the several intervening versions of Philips were incomplete.
Unfortunately, legal writers on the clergy privilege, including Justice Scalia in Flores,
have almost invariably relied on those incomplete derivatives. Sampson's original
1813 report has been relied on only by those later editors and (since its facsimile
republication in 1974) by Michael James Callahan (1976), Judge Julia Cooper Mack
(1987), Michael McConnell (1990), myself (1991), and O'Brien and Flannery (1991)
(as well as by various religious historians discussing Philips).
Ironically, despite banished human rights cause lawyer William Sampson's
ultimately complete postcolonial triumph over the inherited anglocentric colonial
jurisprudence, his original constitutional justifications for the clergy privilege in
Philips were largely eclipsed by the codifying statutes that his equality test case later
successfully inspired throughout the Union. While New York's 1828 codification set in
motion a gradual Irish-American jurisprudential revolution against the prevailing anti-
Catholic English common law, that legislative model also deflected attention from
Mayor Clinton's pioneering judicial reasoning. The Philips court relied on the
constitutional guarantee of free religious exercise, and on the need for the United
States to develop a nationalist common-law jurisprudence. Wigrnore's influential but
inaccurate anglocentric historiography obscured his own support for a postcolonial,
Amercan common-law clergy privilege. Struck by the nationwide adoption of New
York's early codification of Philips, later legal theorists have tended towards
Wigmore's antihistorical assumption that the privilege was purely statutory in origin.
Today, this jurisprudential misconception continues to inform conventional scholarly
and judicial misunderstandings of the clergy privilege.
With the possible recent exception of Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court has
seemingly taken the clergy privilege for granted since first approving it in 1875.218 A
century later, the Supreme Court included an elaborate version of the clergy privilege
along with eight others submitted to Congress for approval. 1 9 In 1973, Congress
declined to adopt any of those proposed privileges, partly because some lawmakers
adopted Professor Louisell's argument and insisted that evidentiary privilege law
protects substantive rather than procedural rights, and is therefore beyond the Supreme
Court's rulemaking power. Instead, Congress preferred to allow the federal law of
evidentiary privileges to develop on a case-by-case basis.220 Notably, in contrast to the
other proposed privileges, the clergy privilege was not attacked during the 1973
debates, but was rather treated as "a long-recognized principle of American law.",
221
A year later, in rejecting President Nixon's claim for an executive privilege, the
Court noted that "generally, an attorney or a priest may not be required to disclose
what has been received in professional confidence." 222 More recently, in refusing to
218. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
219. Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183 (1973).
220. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 1990)
221. Id. at 381.
222. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
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recognize a spousal privilege, the federal high court described the clergy privilege as
"rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust. The priest-penitent privilege
recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute
confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly
consolation and guidance in return."
223
Within the past couple of decades, the historic constitutional underpinnings of the
priest-penitent privilege, as established in Philips, have returned to the center of
academic controversy. Out of concern for the national problem of child abuse, many
states have enacted statutes imposing reporting obligations on doctors,
psychotherapists, and other professionals who suspect that a child is at risk.224 Some of
these statutes explicitly require clergy to report confidentially communicated
information to the authorities, and others seem to do so implicitly.
These reporting statutes raise anew the central question of the clergy privilege's
fundamental basis in religious freedom. Does the clergy privilege exist at the mere
discretion of state legislatures, or does it instead rest on some stronger, constitutional
foundation? A major modem test of the clergy privilege's constitutional dimensions
seems imminent. So far, every modem court and almost every commentator who has
considered this issue has followed William Sampson and Mayor Clinton in concluding
that the clergy privilege does indeed rest on constitutional guarantees of free religious
exercise. Most of these discussions, however, took place before the Supreme Court
recently retreated from the constitutional theory of free exercise exemptions originally
announced in Philips.
225
223. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). Apart from Flores, the only
other conflicting utterance came in the famous case protecting Jehovah's Witness children from
a compelled flag salute. Ironically enough, it is contained in the concurrence of Justice Murphy,
the only justice to decide that case on free exercise rather than free speech grounds, and
moreover the only Catholic on the court. Justice Murphy wrote:
The right of freedom of thought and of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution against state action includes both the right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as essential operations of
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society-as in
the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). It is
unclear whether Justice Murphy actually had the clergy privilege in mind. Because he was such
a staunch champion of civil liberties, that seems unlikely to Professor Eugene Gressman, who
began his judicial clerkship with Justice Murphy only a few months after Barnette was decided,
and continued working in his chambers until 1948. Telephone Interview with Professor Eugene
Gressman, North Carolina School of Law (Spring 1997).
224. See generally Robert Weisberg & Michael Wald, Confidentiality Laws and State
Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q.
143 (1984).
225. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Several articles written prior
to Smith found reporting requirements as applied to clergy unconstitutional on free exercise
grounds. William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse: A
Statutory and Constitutional Analysis, 21 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 1 (1987); Mary H.
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege
and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1987); William N. Ivers, Note, When
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During the 1990s, while the United States Supreme Court in Smith and Flores
discarded the conscientious exemption announced in Philips and embraced in Sherbert,
both federal and state legislatures struggled to preserve that constitutional exemption
principle from judicial encroachment. 226 In that decade, several important cases
examined the historic, constitutional foundations of the postcolonial clergy privilege.
In Simpson v. Tennant,227 the first such fin-de-millennium case to rely on Philips, the
Texas Court of Appeals approached the issue as a question of statutory interpretation.
On facts identical to Philips, the court ruled that the clergy privilege protects not just
the content of secret communications, but also the identity of their bearer; Justice
Cannon relied on Father Kohlmann's 1813 refusal to name the penitent who brought
him stolen jewelry, which was then restored to its rightful owner.
228
In holding that the clergy privilege protects even nonpenitential spiritual
communications within The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Utah
Supreme Court put the clergy privilege on a constitutional footing. In Scott v.
Hammock, 229 decided just a couple of weeks after Simpson, Associate Chief Justice
Stewart borrowed from the scholarly resurgence of Philips to offer a historical
summary of the clergy privilege's development. Relying heavily on the constitutional
theory introduced in Philips, the court determined that even suspected child abuse by
the penitent did not overcome the need for a broad reading of Utah's clergy privilege
statute, one necessary for that statute to comport with both the federal Free Exercise
Clause and the state constitution's protection of religious freedom. The Utah Supreme
Court blithely ignored Smith, in which the federal Supreme Court had recently rejected
the constitutional doctrine of free exercise exemptions first recognized in Philips.
The following year, in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,230 a
Connecticut trial court faced another case involving suspected child abuse by the
penitent. No statutory resolution was possible, however, because the state clergy
Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse Reporting Statute?: Resolution to the Priest's
Conflicting Duties, 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 431 (1987); Kathryn Keegan, Note, The Clergy-Penitent
Privilege and the Child Abuse Reporting Statute: Is the Secret Sacred?, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev.
1031 (1986); Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege
Statutes: Let Free Exercise ofReligion Govern, 62 Ind. L.J. 397 (1987); see also Jeffrey Warren
Scott, Confidentiality and Child Abuse: Church and State Collides, Christian Century 174-76
(Feb. 19, 1986). Two articles written after Smith reach the same conclusion. Alexander D. Hill
& Chi-Dooh Li, A Current Church-State Battleground: Requiring Clergy to Report Child
Abuse, 32 J. Church & State 795 (1990); Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The
Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating that ClergyReport ChildAbuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1 (1991). All of these articles finding the clergy privilege constitutionally protected rely on
Philips in reaching their conclusion. A contrary opinion was reached in a state attorney general
opinion. Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Child Abuse Reporting Statute as Applied to
Clergy, Op. Tex. Attorney General No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985).
226. In my article The First Free Exercise Case, supra note 4, 1 discuss the implications
of Philips for the constitutional theory of religious exemptions, including its implications for
these most recent controversies.
227. 871 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 1 also discuss Simpson in my article The
First Free Exercise Case, supra note 4, at 59.
228. Simpson, 871 S.W.2d at 312.
229. 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994). I also discuss Scott in Walsh, supra note 4, at 59-60.
230. Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV 93 302072, 1995
WL 348181 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 31, 1995). I also discuss Rosado in Walsh, supra note 4.
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privilege statute protected only the minister from forced disclosure, not the accused
penitent. Nevertheless, going beyond the statute, the court declared that Connecticut
common law must be read in light of the nation's postcolonial origins and its historical
constitutional commitment to religious liberty. Invoking Philips, the Connecticut court
declared that "[w]hatever the basis, since the early nineteenth century, courts have
manifested a reluctance to compel the disclosure of confidential communications to the
clergy. ',231 Judge Levin was satisfied that the statutory limitation was an oversight, and
that recognizing the penitent as an additional holder of the privilege would indeed
further its benevolent social purpose. Accordingly, in an erudite opinion, Judge Levin
announced a rule of Connecticut common law, implied by constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom, that penitents may not be forced to disclose their own spiritual
communications any more than the clergy to whom they entrust their confidences.
The next year, in Nestle v. Commonwealth of Virginia,232 the Virginia Court of
Appeals faced the identical issue posed in Rosado, but chose to treat the issue as one of
pure statutory construction, concluding that only the clergy hold the privilege. The
defendant, who was charged with embezzlement of church funds, had successfully
asserted the clergy privilege at trial. This ruling was reversed on appeal when the court
held "that under Virginia law, the priest-penitent privilege belongs to the clergyman,
not the layman." 233 Again, the court relied on Philips as the historical foundation of the
American clergy privilege, noting that even today this evidentiary principle constitutes
a significant postcolonial constitutional deviation from English common law.
In early 1997, the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided a case
which had already achieved international notoriety. InMockaitis v. Harcleroad,234 an
Oregon district attorney had secretly taped the sacramental j ailhouse confession of an
accused murderer, with the intention of introducing its contents at trial. When this
became known, a public outcry resulted. Father Timothy Mockaitis, the Catholic priest
who heard the confession, and other diocesan representatives immediately demanded
that the tape be destroyed, and that no further taping of sacramental confessions take
place in the jail. District attorney Douglass Harcleroad stood his ground, claiming that
such evidence might help convict a brutal killer.
Without any notice to Father Mockaitis, two successive trial judges issued separate
orders allowing the prosecution to seize and transcribe the tape, and holding that the
diocese had no standing to object. Under intense public pressure, district attorney
Harcleroad sheepishly conceded that while his action was both legal and ethical, it was
"simply not right" and fell "within the zone of societally unacceptable conduct." 235
Curiously, however, the accused penitent sided with the prosecution, claiming that the
tape exonerated him: "I want the tape to be preserved and for my attorneys to be able
to use it as evidence in my defense, because people may not believe what I say about it.
Lots of people think that I confessed to killing the victims because of the news reports
about the tape, but I didn't confess to that because I didn't do it."'2 36 Father Mockaitis
and his archbishop then sued in the federal district court, which refused to interfere
231. Rosado, 1995 WL 348181, at *14.
232. 470 S.E.2d 133 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). I also discuss Nestle in Walsh, supra note 4.
233. 470 S.E.2d 133 at 137.
234. 104 F.3d 1522 (1997). I also discuss Mockaitis in Walsh, supra note 4.
235. 104 F.3d at 1527.
236. Id.
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with the pending state criminal prosecution, reasoning that the defendant's right to a
fair trial outweighed the First Amendment rights of Father Mockaitis.
237
On appeal, Father Mockaitis argued that the federal district court had denied his
religious freedom rights under the First Amendment, under the Oregon state
constitution, and under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"); had
denied his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment; and had also denied his rights
under the Wiretapping Act and the Civil Rights Act. District attorney Harcleroad
responded that the RFRA was unconstitutional and that his actions were otherwise
perfectly lawful. The United States entered the case as amicus curiae to defend the
RFRA's constitutionality. The opinion for the Ninth Circuit federal appeals court was
written by Judge John Noonan, ironically perhaps the most prominent Catholic
intellectual on the federal bench, together with Justice Scalia. In contrast to Justice
Scalia, Judge Noonan joined Judges Thompson and Kleinfeld in upholding the
constitutionality of the RFRA. The Mockaitis court denied only the request for
destruction of the controversial tape, pointing out that the penitent had his own right to
disclose the substance of his own sacramental confession, and reasoning that the
continuing existence of the tape during the pending prosecution did nothing to burden
Father Mockaitis's religious exercise. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the Roman
Catholic diocese, ensuring that no future intrusions into the priest-penitent relationship
would occur.23s
Judge Noonan wrote that there was "no question"239 that the district attorney's
actions violated the First Amendment rights of both Father Mockaitis and the jail
inmates. Relying on a previously untried constitutional theory, Judge Noonan also held
that the taping of the sacramental confession violated Father Mockaitis's expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. "[T]he history of the nation has shown a
uniform respect for the character of sacramental confession as inviolable by
government agents interested in securing evidence of crime from the lips of
criminal[s]." For this proposition, Judge Noonan cited Philips, saying that "The first
known case in the United States to consider such an attempt is famous for the court's
rejection of the invasion and for the court's reason for its rejection. '240
In Mockaitis, Judge Noonan quoted at considerable length from Mayor Clinton's
opinion in Philips. Like the other courts that have recently confronted this issue, Judge
Noonan summarized the history of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege, including
its codification and its apparent adoption by the federal Supreme Court. Because no
case exists in which a court has permitted a government agency to break the seal of the
Catholic confessional, Father Mockaitis reasonably relied on "the nation's history of
respect for religion in general and respect for the sanctity of the secrets ofconfession in
particular, and so had a reasonable expectation of privacy."
241
237. Id. at 1522.
238. Id. at 1530-34.
239. Id. at 1530.
240. Id. at 1532.
241. Id. at 1533. Since Mockaitis, another federal circuit court has considered the
applicability of the priest-penitent privilege to communications between Alcoholics Anonymous
members while declining to consider whether they are constitutionally protected. Cox v. Miller,
296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Just a few months after Mockaitis, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Flores joined in
the federal Supreme Court's declaration that the RFRA was unconstitutional, and
argued that the Philips doctrine of constitutional exemptions from generally applicable
laws lacks historical support. In particular, Justice Scalia insisted that Philips was
wrongly decided and, he seems to argue, provides no constitutional free exercise
justification for the priest-penitent privilege. In Flores, Justice Scalia thus became the
first Supreme Court jurist to cast doubt on the constitutionality of the clergy privilege,
criticizing Philips as "weak authority," a "lone case" from a "minor court," which had
completely misread the constitutional free exercise guarantees in Jeffersonian
America.
242
In reaching this aberrant conclusion, Justice Scalia's only judicial ally is
Pennsylvania's antebellum Chief Justice Gibson in Simon's Executor's v. Gratz
(1831).243 In fact, 13 courts have directly cited Philips as historical support for an
American clergy privilege, 4 before the Civil War, and 9 since the Second World War,
and Philips' win-loss record now stands at an impressive 11-2. Indeed, Philips' post-
war renaissance after a century of judicial oblivion has recently gained strong
momentum, since fully half of these baker's dozen references to Philips have come
within the past decade, most notably in Flores.2"
VI. PHILIPS' LESSON FOR POSTCOLONIAL JURISPRUDENCE
Why the enduring jurisprudential legacy of William Sampson's hibemocentric
postcolonial constitutional principle of a priest-penitent testimonial privilege?
Despite frequent scholarly failure to notice the postcolonial constitutional and
common-law justifications for the now-codified priest-penitent privilege, religious
liberty is routinely assigned as its basic rationale. 245 Legal scholars have also touted a
242. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997). For a full critique of Justice
Scalia's historiography, see Walsh, supra note 4.
243. Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 416-18 (Pa. 1831).
244. All of these cases are cited supra note 108, and discussed in detail in Walsh, supra
note 4.
245. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,45 (1980); In Re Verplank, 329 F. Supp.
433, 435 (C. D. Cal. 1971); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, supra note 2; People v.
Smith, 2 Rogers' N.Y. City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817), reproduced in 1
AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 779 (John D. Lawson ed., 1914).
For legal scholarship, see BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 166;
BEST, supra note 139 §§ 990-94; Callahan, supra note 13, at 333-37; CHARLES MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (1985); GREENLEAF, Supra note 142; Hogan, supra note 193;
Timothy Walker, Editor's Note to People v. Phillips, 1 West. L.J. 109, 113-114 (1844); W.F.
Finlason, Note to Regina v. Hay, 2 Foster & Finlason 4, 175 Eng. Rep. 933 (Assizes 1860);
Note on the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 6 JURIST (n.s.), Pt. 2, 320-21 (London 1860); EDWARD
BADELEY, THE PRIVILEGE OF RELIGIOUS CONFESSIONS IN ENGLISH COURTS OF JUSTICE
CONSIDERED, IN A LETTER TO A FRIEND (1865); WHARTON, supra note 122 §§ 580-83;
COLERIDGE, supra note 137, at 364; Reese, supra note 106; Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287;
Yellin, supra note 106 at 112-13. Of these theorists, the following have relied explicitly on
constitutional free exercise grounds: Callahan, Philips, Walker, Anonymous (Privileged
Communications). Others may do so implicitly: Trammel, Smith, Cook, Mullen, Verplank, and
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dizzying array of additional explanations. Like religious liberty, some are principled. A
second justification is that the clergy privilege is in the general realm of the right to
privacy. 246 Third, in similar vein, some argue that relationships of trust should not be
broken by the law.247 Fourth, it is sometimes seen as necessary to protect both penitent
and clergy from incriminating themselves.
248
Next come several justifications that are roughly utilitarian. Fifth, it is said the
public expects that such communications will be protected. 49 Sixth, there is the
utilitarian claim of a benefit to society from the repentance of wrongdoers and their
250diversion from crime. Seventh, on similar grounds it is argued that confidential
communications between believers and their spiritual advisers serve a socially
benevolent therapeutic purpose for those in trouble. 25' Eighth, and equally
pragmatically, some point to the futility of seeking testimony from those who are
bound to conceal it.252 Ninth, the clergy privilege satisfies Wigmore's four utilitarian
canons for the protection of confidential communications, which embody several of the
above rationales.
253
Other disparate justifications for the priest-penitent privilege remain. Tenth, there is
the historical argument that the English denial of the privilege since the Protestant
Restoration is a perversion of the early common law.254 Eleventh, the postcolonial
McCormick. Hogan seemed to recognize the constitutional argument, but found it lacking in
precedent. Kuhlmann, a strong but pessimistic supporter of the privilege, concluded that
Philips' constitutional foundation would be rejected today in light of more recent cases
describing the privilege as purely statutory. Yellin left the free exercise argument open.
246. Reese, supra note 106, at 60.
247. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Reese, supra note
106, at 181; Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 286; 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW I (2d ed. Boston 1923); WHARTON, supra note 122, § 596; COLERIDGE, supra
note 137, at 364;Yellin, supra note 106, at 110-11, 113.
248. People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, supra note 2;
Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 161 (1818); People v. Smith, 2 Rogers' N.Y.
City-Hall Recorder 77 (Ct. Oyer & Term. 1817), reproduced in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 779
(John D. Lawson ed., 1914); Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287; Callahan, supra note 13, at
328, 333.
249. WHARTON, supra note 122 §596; 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2394
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Cook v. Carroll, [ 1945] I.R. 515 (Ir. H. Ct.); Reese, supra note 106, at
81; Yellin, supra note 106, at 95.
250. People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, supra note 2;
9 BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 166; Reese, supra note 106;
WIGMORE, supra note 249; Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287; Yellin, supra note 106, at 109,
113.
251. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,45 (1980). Reese, supra note 106, at 81-
82; Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287.
252. Reese, supra note 106, at 81; Yellin supra note 106, at 110-113; Kuhlmann argues
that without the privilege, such communications would "dry up," with no gain to society.
Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 287.
253. Cook v. Carroll, [1945] I.R. 515 (Ir. H. Ct.); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d
275, 279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1959); WIGMORE, supra note 249.
254. Note on the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 6 JURIST (n.s.), Pt. 2, 319, 320 (London
1860); BADELEY, supra note 245; Best, supra note 139 §§ 583-585; W.F. Finlason, Note to
Regina v, Hay, 2 Foster & Finlason 4, 175 Eng. Rep. 933 (Assizes 1860) Nolan, The Law of the
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clergy privilege has been recognized because of the need to construct a nationalist
jurisprudence free of colonial debris.25 5 Last, and surely most bizarre, is the rationale
offered by the English Victorian jurist, Justice Willes, who resolved to uphold the
clergy privilege on the ground that "[albsolution is a judicial act .... and no judge is
ever obliged to state his reasons for his decision.,
256
Modem American controversies no longer concern themselves with establishing the
existence of the posteolonial priest-penitent privilege, but rather with defining its
unruly scope. In 1963, Reese reported that "relatively few cases in the field have
reached appellate courts."2 57 He located decisions in only fourteen out of the forty-four
states that then had clergy statutes. Five years later, Kuhlmann could discover "no
rhyme or reason in the cases" to guide the clergy. "The court's decision on the issue of
privilege often seems to depend more on the result the court wants to reach on the
substantive issue in the case than on a logical application of the clergyman-privilege
statute." 258 As late as 1983, Yellin still found that "relatively few cases" had considered
the privilege. 9 Since colonial times, he compared roughly seventy indexed cases on
the clergy privilege nationwide with almost double that number on the attomey-client
privilege in California alone over a shorter period. Dissatisfied with the manifest
failure of the proposed uniform rule on the clergy privilege, Reese, Kuhlmann, and
Yellin urged and even drafted new model statutes. 2so
Current conflicts regarding the postcolonial clergy evidentiary privilege revolve
around issues such as the following: Who holds the privilege, clergy, congregant, or
both? Can either waive it? Who are "clergy" for the purpose of the privilege? Must
they be acting in their professional capacity? Does the privilege extend to those who
assist them in their work? What about communications to clergy of another
denomination? Beyond sacramental communications like confessions, what other
secrets are protected by the privilege, and does this turn on internal church discipline?
Although the clergy may not disclose what they hear, must they reveal their own
observations during the course of the spiritual communication? And how far does the
privilege go when third parties are threatened? 26' Typical topical tussles, for example,
include whether marital counseling or knowledge of child abuse should be privileged.
In answering such questions, the jurisprudential source of the privilege is surely
relevant. Do modem American statutes actually create the clergy privilege, or rather
acknowledge constitutional, common-law, or natural human rights? Mayor Clinton's
postcolonial legal reasoning in Philips is quite different to that of modem courts
parroting Wigmore that have routinely failed to examine this fascinating jurisprudential
Seal of the Confessional, 13 Cath. Encyc. 649 (1913); Callahan, supra note 13, at 334-37;
Yellin, supra note 106, at 95-101.
255. People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, supra note 2;
Cook v. Carroll, [1945] I.R. 515 (Ir. H. Ct.); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); In Re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C. D. Cal. 1971). Callahan, supra note 13.
256. COLERIDGE, supra note 137.
257. Reese, supra note 106, at 58-59.
258. Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 269.
259. Yellin, supra note 106, at 95-96.
260. Kuhlmann, supra note 106, at 286-92; Reese, supra note 106, at 80-88; Yellin,
supra note 106, at 142-56.
261. For answers to these questions, and more, see Kuhlmann, supra note 106; Reese,
supra note 106; Yellin, supra note 106.
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history. Most legal scholars have been equally delinquent. Throughout its history, and
certainly since Philips was argued as a test case for New York's Irish Catholic exiles
by their banished United Irish cause lawyer William Sampson, the Irish-American
clergy privilege has been intimately tied to the larger constitutional and human rights
history of religious freedom and equality.
On the jurisprudential conundrum of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege,
neither constitutional nor evidentiary scholars have ever fully come to grips with the
intricate and interdependent relationships between ideology, power, and legal doctrine.
Perhaps among the most thoughtful, if still inadequate, descriptions of the clergy
privilege's political dimensions is that offered by the student editors of the Harvard
Law Review in their essay on the evolution of the law of evidence. The Harvard editors
come closest to capturing the Sampsonian essence of the postcolonial priest-penitent
evidentiary privilege. They begin by rejecting as incoherent the two primary rationales,
Wigmore's utilitarian canons and the privacy theory, that have been offered to justify
the law of privileges in general. With respect to Wigmore's four canons ("the
traditional justification"), the authors note telling attacks on their lack of empirical
262foundation. With respect to the privacy theory, the authors point out that it provides
no normative standard for choosing which interests are to be protected.263
In place of these older rationales, the review editors attempt a political explanation
for the confused body of privilege law, including the priest-penitent privilege. Two
new theories of evidentiary privileges are proposed, the power theory and the image
theory.264 The power theory largely departs from the received dichotomy between law
and politics. "It asserts instead that the real roots of privilege law lie in the power of
those benefiting from it .... It explains privilege law not as an effort to encourage
communications or to protect privacy, but as special treatment won by the power of
those privileged., 265 The power theory suggests that both legislative and judicial
decisions on privilege law are influenced by powerful minorities advancing their self-
interest. Indeed, the very word "privilege" transparently suggests the protection of "a
favored elite."
266
The image theory is a variant of the power theory. It posits that the law of privileges
may be understood as a means of preserving the image and legitimacy of the legal
system. By avoiding confrontations with those most likely to defy the authority of the
court, the distribution of privileges masks the system's possible incapacity to compel
obedience. 267 Both the power theory and the image theory see privileges as politically
influenced, but the power theory focuses on power relations among litigants, whereas
the image theory focuses on the allocation of power between judges and litigants.
26 8
In marked contrast, under the questionable historical methodology of recent
constitutional theorists such as Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Gerard Bradley,
the reasons that impelled Mayor Clinton and three other judges in Philips to recognize
a free exercise exemption must be peremptorily dismissed as "a political
262. Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 1472-80.
263. id. at 1480-83.
264. Id. at 1493-1500.
265. Id. at 1493.
266. Id. at 1494.
267. Id. at 1498-99.
268. Id. at 1500.
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phenomenon." 269 Thus, that early, deliberate constitutional defense of a religious,
cultural, ethnic, and political minority must be suppressed. Instead, the Harvard editors
candidly consider "whether the imperfect political input of powerful minorities is per
se delegitimating or whether it could ever actually legitimate privilege law."'27 By the
nature of normative choice, they point out, legal and political decisions are informed
by a social vision that incorporates particular empirical assumptions about human
behavior and values. Announced justifications for the law of privileges are not
rendered incoherent simply because some predominant social vision supplies their
assumptions and shapes their contours. The fact that political power influences these
normative and empirical assumptions does not show that the proffered rationale is
applied illegitimately. "Indeed, the legitimacy of these decisions requires that the
assumptions be politically influenced.
2 71
Doesn't acknowledging the legitimacy of political influence risk privileging the
interests of a powerful majority over those of the powerless minority? It is certainly
true that the more powerful the group, the more likely that its vision of behavior and
value will predominate, reply the Harvard writers. "But competing visions of
behavioral patterns and social values will always exist. '272 This requires a compromise
equilibrium which advances the interests of the powerful while gaining the
acquiescence of the less powerful in society.
But the Harvard Law Review editors then stumble in their particular effort to
explain the Irish-American postcolonial priest-penitent privilege. They begin with the
uncontroversial observation that the clergy privilege is founded on a social vision that
values the sanctity of religious counseling. This belief certainly serves the groups
promoting it, but it may also serve the society that accepts it. Then they make this
ahistorical pronouncement: "[A]lthough the recognition of the priest-penitent privilege
undoubtedly stems in part from the power of the Catholic Church, its recognition also
stems from an accommodation by the secular state to the religious beliefs of a large
population., 273 Neither proposition accurately describes the historical circumstances
surrounding Philips. Moreover, in locating "power" within society, the law review
editors describe the legal regulation of social relations as something static, not as a
shifting jurisprudential product of political struggle.
Although the review authors duly apply their power theory to explain the current
recognition of the clergy privilege, they fail hopelessly in accounting historically for its
surprisingly early appearance in the postcolonial Jeffersonian United States. This is
surely conspicuous, since the editors claim subtle support for their version of a power
theory in the historical evolution of privilege justifications. In the legislature, they note,
the influence of powerful minorities has been illustrated by the fact that many new
privileges have been won through successful lobbying.274 Older judicially recognized
doctrines such as the attorney-client and marital privileges can also be explained by the
power theory, the former in terms of the power of lawyers, the latter in terms of the
269. Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of
Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 245, 292 (1991). For a full critique, see Walsh, supra note 4.
270. Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 1496.
271. Id. (emphasis in original).
272. Id. at 1497.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1494.
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historic domination of wives by husbands. 275 Conversely, the Harvard writers propose
that rising egalitarianism may have killed off the eighteenth-century privilege shielding
the honor of "gentlemen" who had promised confidentiality.
276
Historically, as attested by their complete silence on the matter, the postcolonial
priest-penitent privilege is problematic for the Harvard Law Review's analysis. Simply
stated, their version of a power theory does not easily account for Philips'
constitutional break from the English common law. Professor Gerard Bradley does
point out that Philips can readily be understood in terms of Mayor Clinton's close
political ties to the United Irish immigrant community which flocked to New York
after the failed rebellion of 1798. But this quick explanation is at best superficial with
regard to Philips; and, more importantly, it utterly fails to comprehend the subsequent
legislative and judicial adoption of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege
nationwide. Surprisingly, perhaps, this transformation in human rights jurisprudence
occurred through the course of a persistent and often violent tradition of American
nativist anti-Catholicism that has extended well into the present century. In 1813, when
Philips was decided, far from a being a favored elite, Sampson's immigrant Irish
Catholic refugee clients were barely tolerated cultural outsiders. They fought for
equality, not for dominance. Theirs was a principled triumph for human rights, not a
show of force. Jeffersonian New York City's Irish Catholic refugee community can be
termed a powerful minority only by saying the same today of many other historically-
excluded groups such as African-Americans, women, or the gay and lesbian
community.
We can look towards William Sampson's United Irish postcolonial legal rhetoric in
Philips for the key to unlocking this perplexing jurisprudential puzzle. Sampson's
argument in hibernocentric postcolonial jurisprudence for Father Kohlmann is certainly
one important early articulation of a power theory of law, but Sampson offers a critical
refinement that is often missed. Sampson pointed out that control of legal ideology
itself confers normative legitimacy, for better or for worse. Even during the
disintegration of the Irish Penal Laws against Roman Catholics, recognition of the
priest-penitent privilege by a Protestant judiciary was unlikely. "The system under
which they acted; the barbarous code with which they were familiar, was enough to
taint their judgment. No judge, no legislator, historian, poet or philosopher, but what
has been tinctured with the follies or superstitions of his age." 277 In rejecting the
privilege, "may we not well suspect those Irish judges to have imbibed the poison of
their cruel code, and to have eaten of the insane root that taketh the reason prisoner.'278
More recently, Marxist critical theorists have similarly dwelt on the ability of the
dominant order to regenerate itself without apparent coercion, Gransci speaking in
terms of ideological hegemony and Bourdieu in terms of symbolic capital. While
acknowledging that legal ideology reflects existing distributions of power, these
thinkers follow Sampson in suggesting that legal ideology also acts autonomously,
itself either perpetuating or reallocating political power distributions. Thus, any
calculation of political power must somehow weigh the rhetorical force of insurgent
legal argumentation, whose radical ideological power lies precisely in the doubtful
275. Id. at 1527 n.146.
276. Id. at 1495.
277. SAMPSON, supra note 2, at 64.
278. d.
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domain of human interpretation. A power theory of law is of little use if it merely
retrospectively purports to confirm some false inevitability of legal rules. It would be
valuable only if one could anticipate, prospectively, the political power of some
untested legal claim against an existing power distribution. Put differently, when
Philips was argued in a New York City courtroom in that hot, fateful summer of 1813,
was the postcolonial jurisprudential history of the Irish-American priest-penitent
privilege somehow already ordained? How so?
The Harvard authors avoid these difficult questions. They simply say that "[tihe
acceptability of any particular vision to other groups will determine both whether that
vision predominates and, concomitantly, the power of the group promoting that
vision."'279 Their static approach to privilege justifications obscures the constant that
emergent legal ideologies are in themselves important sources of political power. It is
impossible to measure the political power of competing social groups without first
attributing a precise value to the legal rhetoric at their disposal. In impact litigation
such as Philips, the power of the group seeking to convert its political demands into
legal doctrine is not simply concomitant upon the acceptability of its social vision to
other groups: social acceptance is itself conditioned by the persuasive articulation of
revisionist legal ideology.
Philips was argued during the continuance of colonial laws denying equal civil
rights to Roman Catholics, long before their refugee immigrant community had gained
a strong demographic or constitutional foothold in the United States. Thus, Philips
cannot be understood as a simple reaction to political considerations. To the contrary,
the tenuous influence of the Irish Catholic refugees was a product of the radical
egalitarian United Irish legal rhetoric constructed by their advocates. In response,
Mayor Clinton and his fellow judges made a calculated choice to break and reallocate
prevailing political power by legitimating the iconoclastic legal theory of a hitherto
excluded group. Not content with this courtroom victory, Sampson continued his
assault on the anti-Catholic premises of the English common law with his publication
of The Catholic Question in America and his nationalist push for wholesale
codification. Only a Sampsonian recognition of the independent political power
unleashed by these subversive but emergent postcolonial legal ideologies can fully
explain the subsequent endorsement of the clergy privilege by a Protestant judiciary,
and its nationwide adoption by state legislatures in which Catholics were typically
outnumbered.
As every minority knows, resistance tests power. In the words of William Sampson,
"to the just resistance of the people is owed everything boasted of in our political
theory. 2 8 0 This is empirically evident from the history of the American clergy
privilege from Philips onwards. Historically, the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege
did not merely react to the power of the historically distrusted Catholic Church in the
United States, but rather that legal principle itself constituted a vital source of that
power. Ideologically armed with the very political power they had newly acquired
through constitutional guarantees of free religious exercise, judicial application of that
protection in Philips, and increasing statutory recognition of their legal equality, the
279. Privileged Communications, supra note 104, at 1497 (emphasis added).
280. WILLIAM SAMPSON, ADVICE TO THE RICH 7 (Dublin 1796). The posteolonial
American priest-penitent privilege of Philips was adopted in place of the colonial Irish decision
of Butler v. Moore.
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rapidly growing American Catholic minority gradually claimed cultural space in a
formerly closed and hostile society. By doing so, they forced open the door for other
excluded minorities to follow them by asserting similar claims to freedom and equality.
New York City's United Irish immigrants thus laid vital historical foundations for the
uniquely American phenomenon of multicultural pluralism that the federal Supreme
Court recognized in Sherbert a century and a half later.
In this Article, I have followed the jurisprudential influence of Philips, the first
successful free exercise case in American constitutional law, as the historical source of
the Irish-American posteolonial priest-penitent privilege in the law of evidence. I have
suggested that constitutional and evidentiary historians typically misread Philips
because they fail to appreciate its complex ethnic and ideological dimensions. In its
inception, its argumentation, and its resolution, the first free exercise case did not turn
on so-called original intent, but rested on a radically revisionist United Irish portrait of
the historic persecution suffered by New York City's immigrant Irish Catholics. The
courtroom victory of an oppressed people in Philips reflected a great deal more than
one judge's views. In the first free exercise case, an historically-excluded American
minority successfully asserted their postcolonial constitutional claim to religious,
political, and cultural equality in their adopted republican homeland. By tracing the
legal history of that case, I have tried to offer this postcolonial jurisprudence of
struggle which stands opposed to the imperial tradition of repressing religious freedom
in the North American colonies.
After challenging previous interpretations ofPhilips, I located that decision within a
larger story of power and resistance. I have tried to decipher William Sampson's
postcolonial legal theory and practice which draws heavily upon Sampsonian thought
and experience. Although critical in inspiration, that jurisprudence nowhere discounts
the central importance of legal ideology. Rather, legal structure is presented as a
changing cultural artifact which both reflects and engenders social conflict. Minority
groups such as the immigrant Irish have had to destabilize existing political structures
and cultural norms. In the courtroom, such political demands gain authority precisely
because they are presented as legal claims. Legal ideology is not simply the contested
prize of political struggle, it also sets the terms within which resistance takes place.
Just as law can be the instrument of dominant power, it can also be the lever that
overturns an oppressive social order. Hence, a postcolonial jurisprudence explicitly
recognizes the central role of legal ideology in both establishing and destroying
structures of political and cultural domination.
This recovered history suggests that Louisell's hunch was surely right. Empirical
study does show that the adoption of William Sampson's postcolonial 1813 argument
for the priest-penitent privilege was indeed a signal early triumph for human rights
jurisprudence and equality theory. As the first constitutional victory for religious
freedom, and the first judicially recognized conscientious exemption, Philips teaches
us much about the postcoloial minority legal politics of religion, ethnicity, equality
and cultural inclusion. From that minority hibernocentric perspective, Philips
represented a legal victory for the political demand of the Irish Catholic refugees to be
accepted as equals in their adopted republic. At no time in American constitutional
history has that jurisprudence of minority struggle lain dormant, although its full
implications have become increasingly manifest since the 1960s. At the outset of that
decade, after a long history of exclusion and resistance, the Irish Catholic immigrants
finally achieved their great American symbol of minority inclusion: John Fitzgerald
Kennedy, a son of Irish immigrants, was elected the first Roman Catholic president of
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the United States. This essay on the history of the postcolonial Irish-American priest-
penitent privilege is an essay on the early history of modem human rights
jurisprudence, long before the more recent adoption of international treaties.
At this point I shall lay down my pen. I have tried to write the first postcolonial
history of the clergy privilege's gradual transcendence over the prior anglocentric
jurisprudence inherited from the colonial regime. The story of the Irish-American
priest-penitent privilege is one of shadows, myth, and illusion. If nothing else, it
demonstrates that in legal ideology, perception is the only reality. This history exposes
the political quality of legal doctrine, and offers the means for the destruction of
dominant power through an alternative social vision and the rhetorical elevation of
subversive legal theory. This is William Sampson's jurisprudence of postcolonial
struggle.
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